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Abstract
This dissertation explores various aspects of social influence processes in political behavior
research. Specifically, three separate essays explore the ways in which communication, so-
cial conformity, cultural transmission, and other interpersonal influence processes operate
to generate similar public behaviors among groups of interconnected individuals. Broadly,
the dissertation project develops theoretically a set of general principles about the cognitive
processes, social dynamics, and institutional structures that shape the development, trans-
mission, and transition of social norms. The theoretical arguments are used to inform a
set of experimental research designs that provide empirical evidence for some of the short-
term processes at work, as well as a set of simulations that are informative about the more
long-term processes.
After a brief introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 presents a simulation model of the
cognitive tradeoff between stating a truly held internal attitude and avoiding social deviancy,
as well as the dynamics of interpersonal influence in forced interaction settings. The key
motivation behind the focus on these specific factors is the idea that for most people, many, if
not most, day-to-day social interactions compel them to interact with people who they likely
would not otherwise select to interact with absent common membership in some institution
or organization. It is in these settings with unfamiliar others that the tradeoff between
the expressive satisfaction of stating what one truly believes and the social satisfaction of
exhibiting the group majority behavior is likely to be most obvious. One takeaway point
from this essay is that when individuals place relatively equal weight on the values of internal
consistency and social conformity, the behavior and overall satisfaction levels of the society
at large become much less predictable in the short term, and the average overall satisfaction
of the population takes its lowest value. That is, populations that place significant weight
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on either conformity or consistency experience more satisfaction on average.
Chapter 3 presents a series of laboratory experiments on social influence. In addition to
dealing with non-self-selected group interactions and conformity pressures, as in Chapter
2, several other ideas drove the design employed. One goal was to study very short-term
micro-level processes of social interaction, and the benefit of the experimental setting is the
ability to measure, rather than merely assume, the relative weight that individuals place on
internal consistency, as opposed to social conformity. But the largest goal was to take a set of
general ideas from the empirical research on social conformity, and apply them specifically
to the question of individual expression of equality between groups. In a prediction that
I call the Social Dissonance Hypothesis, I suggest that individuals come to the laboratory
both with their own internal attitudes and some general notion about the range of attitudes
that are socially acceptable in the broader population. When asked to give their views in
isolation, some individuals are willing to express an attitude that runs counter to what is
socially acceptable in the broader population. And among these people, there is a very
strong tendency to change responses when they face a unanimously opposed majority, and
they are compelled to express their attitudes publicly.
Chapter 4 develops a second simulation model in which the intention is to move away from
forced interaction settings. In this model, the key moving parts are the abilities of individuals
to self-select into social relationships, the assumption that individuals can influence each
others’ types through interaction over time, and that individuals are characterized by traits
in more than one dimension. Self selection into social relationships is obviously ubiquitous
in reality, and the idea that individuals can influence types is meant to capture the intuitive
sense that friends tend to become more alike through more interactions. The assumption
that individuals are multidimensional captures the idea that social relationships might be
formed on the basis of one dimension, but later other information may come to light that
can make those social relationships more or less costly. The model shows that types that
were relatively successful tended to be imitated more, and therefore ended up dominating
the population over time. No type tended to have an advantage in general, but for any given
simulation, an agent’s type was consequential for the ultimate utility experienced. A final
chapter offers a very brief conclusion.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the contemporary world, norms of individual equality are a staple of democratic polit-
ical culture. Following long histories of political, economic, and social systems based on
gender, racial, religious, and other forms of hierarchy, principles of equal protection of cit-
izens’ rights are now codified into law in virtually all modern participatory democracies.
Across democratic societies, citizens consistently exhibit high levels of support for the idea
that all people should be treated as political and social equals, without regard to personal
characteristics such as gender, race, religion, or socioeconomic status. Based on public opin-
ion measures, support for principles of equality seem to be a pervasive feature of modern
democratic polities.
To be sure, though, general popular acceptance of egalitarian norms has its limits. Even
genuine support for abstract notions of equality tend to mask a patchwork of compromises
that individuals are willing to tolerate under particular circumstances. Additionally, though
various forms of inequality persist in modern democracies, citizenries often show very lit-
tle support for government action to address them. Even more important, however, the
expressed levels of support for certain egalitarian principles may not be genuine at all. Be-
cause citizens in democratic societies generally carry the belief that egalitarian principles are
widely held, publicly expressing attitudes of an inegalitarian nature may carry the possibil-
ity of embarrassment, or even social sanction. In fact, this threat may have been reinforced
through repeated social interactions over time. In the end, among a possibly substantial
subset of a given populace, self reports of adherence to egalitarian principles may reflect
conformity to social rules that govern appropriate behavior rather than truly held beliefs.
Though it is plausible to believe that this sort of social desirability bias would serve to
inflate expressed levels of public support for egalitarian principles, little is known about how
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the desire to give the appropriate social response operates at the level of interpersonal inter-
actions. That is, within a broader social climate that evokes a strong norm of egalitarianism,
we know little about how everyday interpersonal communications serve to perpetuate both
the norm of acceptable behavior and variation in individuals’ actual attitudes. Empirical
studies of social conformity with respect to general, arbitrary norms established through
social interactions have a long history in the social sciences (Asch 1951, 1952, 1956; Deutsch
and Gerard 1955; Sherif 1935, 1936). However, with respect to political and social attitudes,
empirical examinations of conformity at the interpersonal level are virtually nonexistent (but
see Verhulst and Levitan 2009). Therefore, though we have strong reasons to believe that
expressed public support for egalitarian principles on surveys are inflated, we know little
about how this norm structures, and is structured by, interactions between individuals.
The current study examines various aspects of the relationship between interpersonal in-
fluences and the levels of egalitarianism that individuals are willing to express in public and
private settings. A strong theme throughout will be the maintenance of a distinction be-
tween individuals’ true attitudes, and the attitudes that those same individuals are willing
to express publicly. Using formal theory, computational simulations, and a set of laboratory
experiments, I relate individual-level cognitive processes coupled with interpersonal interac-
tions to large-scale societal changes. In so doing, I attempt to shed light on general processes
of norm development, transition, and change.
The dissertation proceeds as three freestanding essays on social influence in the political
context. Though some portions may contribute to understanding of social influence processes
in more general contexts, a strong theme bringing the essays together is the relationship of
the social influence process under examination to the study of the development, transition,
and transmission of egalitarian and inegalitarian norms. In the following chapter, I present a
formal model of a particular social influence process in non-self-selected (or non-homophilic)
group settings. I then translate the model into a series of computational simulations in
order to derive important implications. In the subsequent chapter, I provide a brief review of
existing literature on social influence processes in order to derive a set of micro-level empirical
hypotheses and test them in a series of laboratory experiments. Following the experiments,
another chapter offers a formal model of actor behavior when self-selection of social partners
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(or homophilic interaction) is possible, and again uses computational simulations to derive
some important results. A final chapter offers concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Norm-Development in Non-Homophilic
Group Interactions: Model and Simulations
In the twentieth century, the United States underwent a massive cultural shift. Norms of
public discourse with respect to racial equality were completely reversed. The idea that the
races could and should be considered social and political equals went from being a view
rarely communicated outside of a small number of intimate social groups to being the only
acceptable mode of public expression regarding race. This transformation has been deep,
wide, and pervasive, effecting large-scale change in discourse across virtually all contexts
of public communication. In most white social circles—in casual friendships, in school, in
the workplace, in politics—whereas open expression of racial egalitarianism had once been a
cause for social censure, eventually any statements of an inegalitarian nature would be met
with strong disapproval, and could potentially cause irreparable damage to a reputation.
The scope of this cultural change is difficult to understate. The body politic of the United
States in the twentieth century experienced a complete displacement of a prevailing social
norm that had helped to define and constrain both mass and elite rhetoric since the founding
of the nation. From establishment, through the Civil War, through Reconstruction, and into
the twentieth century, public agreement with the idea of the inherent superiority of whites
over African Americans was a necessary condition for entry into national, state, and most
local politics. In particular, for the vast majority of white elected officials of the Southern
United States, at least a nominal defense of racial separation was necessary until the 1960s,
and, in some cases, beyond. The necessity of this stance for political survival and career
advancement was a direct consequence of the then-prevailing social norm of racial inequality
in public speech. In rapid historical fashion, however, the idea of racial equality, once publicly
held by only an extremely small minority of the population, grew in the latter half of the
twentieth century to be the prevailing social norm, thereby displacing the norm of racial
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inequality.
To claim that this shift in American culture has occurred is relatively uncontroversial.
Observers of American politics and history will surely note the dramatic conversion of the
United States from a country with a legalized system of black slavery to today’s legal,
social, and political environment that promotes values such as racial tolerance, inclusion,
and diversity, and in which being labeled a racist or bigot is likely to make one a social
outcast. But given the status quo of American thought on matters of racial differences (and
particularly of white racial attitudes) in the mid-twentieth century, the complete turnaround
by the century’s end certainly does not appear to be a priori self-evident. In fact, given the
level of expressed white resistance to the idea of blacks as social and political equals, and
the widespread willingness of elites to exploit and take on leadership roles in that resistance
for electoral gains, the eventual entrenchment of the norm of racial equality is a puzzling
phenomenon. The rapidity with which the change occurred is even more profound. And
the implications for American politics have been far-reaching, permeating social interactions
between and among elites and masses, changing the nature of political campaigns nationwide,
altering the cleavage structure of major-party political competition, and helping to redefine
the coalitions of electoral support for the major political parties.
How did this process of norm displacement occur and, just as importantly, how did it
occur so quickly? In this chapter, I address an important piece of the answer to these
question by situating the process of the displacement of norms of public speech within a
broader story of cultural evolution and focusing on the theoretical impact of forced social
interactions on the motivations of individuals. In particular, I explore individual agents’
sometimes competing desires to publicly express views that are consistent with their own
internal preferences on the one hand, and to maintain social standing within their networks
of social relationships on the other. Under a system of homophilic selection into networks
of relationships within a population that is relatively homogeneous with respect to internal
preferences, desires for internal consistency and social acceptance are unlikely to be in ten-
sion. However, when institutional mechanisms construct non-homophilic networks of social
interactions, these two desires may frequently be opposed. When individuals are forced to
interact with non-familiar others, and when exogenous events lead individuals to be rela-
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tively uncertain about the distribution of preferences in the population, it is reasonable to
expect that publicly expressed opinions may not necessarily comport with privately held
values. Individual idiosyncracies in estimating the distribution of preferences along with the
desire to maintain social status may establish conditions conducive to the rapid transition
from one norm of public expression to another. And importantly, the evolution of norms of
public expression can occur independently of any changes in internal values.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the following section I briefly discuss the historical
context of the norm change that is the basis of my theoretical perspective in order to provide
a direct link between the substantive phenomenon and the more abstract model presented
herein. Following this, I situate the individual-level mechanisms at play in the theory within
the broader social scientific literature on cultural evolution and social pressures to develop
insights into the individual-level mechanisms underlying key aspects of the dynamics of
norms of public speech. Then, I present a simplified model that formalizes these individual-
level mechanisms and some of the features of social structure within small-scale institutions
that are thought to be important components to norms of public discourse on sensitive social
issues. After this, I use the model to perform numerical experiments that demonstrate how
the proposed individual-level mechanisms lead to population-level outcomes as a function of
key parameters. Following the numerical experiments, I offer concluding remarks.
2.1 The Norm of Racial Equality in Public Speech
As stated previously, the transition from a norm of racial inequality to a norm of racial
equality in public speech has permeated all levels of society, having failed to penetrate only
a small minority of closed social groups. In the most general terms, the process of change
unfolded over a period of several hundreds of years, operating at a relatively slow overall rate
for much of U.S. history, and finally achieving a rapid pace in the latter half of the twentieth
century (see, e.g., Mendelberg 2001, chs. 2 and 3 for a more detailed historical development).
Accepting this description as an accurate characterization of the macro-level process of norm
transition does not preclude the existence of significant variation in the pace of micro-level
change. In fact, the society-wide displacement of the norm of racial inequality by the norm of
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racial equality was marked by different rates of piecemeal progression and digression across
social groupings and geographic locations. Over time, the complex relationship between
elite leadership, public opinion, and mass political action gradually advanced the social and
political rights of African Americans and established an ever-changing set of legal codes and
institutions that structure interracial interactions.
With respect to changes in institutions, of particular significance was the patchwork of
public policies aimed at desegregating previously racially segregated institutions. Policies to
combat racial discrimination in various aspects of society along with the eventual vigorous
enforcement of judicial orders to desegregate schools led to a system of interracial contacts
that had previously been unimaginable. In the modeling exercise that follows, while I do
not specifically model interracial interactions, the model is intended to capture aspects of
interactions with unfamiliar others. In a changing environment in which it is known that
interracial contacts are occurring at an increasing rate, the consequences of making racist or
inegalitarian statements even in an intraracial context could be severe. It is this newfound
uncertainty that I contend was among the root causes of movement away from a norm of
racial inequality to a norm of racial equality. No work has focused on the specific impact that
changes in the degree and character of interracial contacts has had on the social acceptability
of speech espousing racial inequality. In survey research on racial attitudes, the potential
social desirability biases of direct measures are widely known and often mentioned, but a
coherent theory or body of empirical evidence on the origin of such biases is absent.
2.2 Micro-level Cultural Transmission: Small Groups
and Social Conformity
To develop a model of the micro-level process of norm development and evolution that has
general appeal, and that can be readily applied to the case of the United States, I begin with
the assumption that conformist transmission (also referred to as frequency-dependent bias)
is adaptive under a wide range of conditions. That is, rather than develop a specific model
of the genetic development of conformist transmission in humans, I appeal to the literature
with respect to its origins and dynamics (Boyd and Richerson 1985, 2005; Henrich 2001;
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Henrich and Boyd 1998, 2001) and begin at the starting point of conformist transmission as
a pervasive human phenomenon. In brief, conformist transmission is the tendency of indi-
viduals in a population to acquire a particular cultural variant due to the relative frequency
of that variant among the individuals’ cultural “parents” (Boyd and Richerson 1985, p. 10).
Boyd and Richerson (1985, 2005) and Henrich and Boyd (2001) note that conformist trans-
mission is not identical to the concept of social conformity as it has typically been examined
in social psychology (e.g., Asch 1951; Sherif 1935), and the difference is rooted in the moti-
vations of individual agents. Specifically, conformist transmission results in the adoption of
cultural traits that are popular because individuals use popularity as an indirect measure of
a trait’s value. Social conformity, on the other hand, results in the adoption of traits that are
popular because individuals consciously try to avoid appearing deviant (Henrich and Boyd
2001). The former represents an internalization of a cultural variant, while the latter can be
a simple change in observable behavior unaccompanied by internal changes.
If we consider norms of public speech to be cultural variants, the distinction between the
concepts of conformist transmission and social conformity becomes murky. It is plausible
to think that changes in public speech with respect to a social referent can and do occur
without always being accompanied by an associated change in internal attitudes with re-
spect to that same referent. Using the characterization of Henrich and Boyd (2001), such a
process would suggest that patterns of public speech at the micro level could be the result
of social conformity. At the macro level, however, large-scale changes in norms of public
speech with respect to a social referent are the result of a broad internalization of what
does and what does not constitute deviant behavior. Notice that I am not claiming that
changes in norms of public speech must be accompanied by large-scale shifts in attitudes.
Rather, I am explicitly maintaining a distinction between public speech and internal atti-
tudes. Further, though it is clear that public speech and internal attitudes with respect to
the same social referents must be related in some ways, it is also reasonable to expect that
certain environmental conditions may cause the two to evolve on different—and sometimes
even opposing—trajectories. Specifying those conditions theoretically and deriving logical
implications are some of the goals of the present chapter.
The dynamics of norms of public speech at the level of the small group, as they have
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been presented here, can be summarized as follows. Norms of public discourse are devel-
oped and maintained through a process of social learning and cultural transmission. Over
successive instances of publicly expressing one’s opinion with respect to a particular social
referent (e.g., race), individuals use the frequency of a publicly expressed value as an indi-
rect measure of its appropriateness in social settings. Positive social reinforcement of the
expressed view acts to strengthen the enculturation process. Additionally, individuals iden-
tify unacceptable public pronouncements by either witnessing or directly experiencing the
social censure of unpopular expression. When disapproval of a particular expressed value is
sufficiently frequent or intense, individuals internalize the unacceptability of that value as
a social fact (Durkheim [1895] 1965). In this way, positive feedback and social censure act
as reinforcement mechanisms that condition the attainment of particular cultural variants
(Bandura 1977). However, internalizing the norms of appropriate social behavior does not
necessarily indicate the internalization of congruent internal attitudes. Critically, norms
of public expression can and often do run counter to privately held individual preferences.
Public compliance with the expressed opinions of others with whom one interacts is consid-
ered to be a type of social conformity that results from a cultural evolutionary process of
conformist transmission.
2.2.1 Theoretical and Methodological Framework
The transition from a norm of public rhetoric that compelled individuals to express a view of
the inherent superiority of whites over other races to the present norm of public rhetoric that
compels individuals to express opinions consistent with full racial equality represents a truly
profound change. To provide a rigorous explanation of the social processes that brought
about this change, I do not simply reconstruct and describe the specific historical details.
Rather, my purpose is to supply a more general description of the essential features of social
interactions that could plausibly have brought about such a change (see, e.g., Carnap 1962;
Ullmann-Margalit 1977). That is, given a set of reasonable assumptions and expectations
about human behavior, the nature of social interactions, and the consequences of policy
changes, I intend to show that the transition in norms of rhetoric was in fact a plausible
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consequence.
With respect to the dynamics and social effects of interpersonal communication within
institutions, I argue that a variety of institutional contexts, including schools and workplaces,
serve to structure interpersonal interactions between individuals who may not necessarily
select into direct social relationships outside of those settings. That is, membership in
settings like schools and workplaces offers opportunities, and sometimes compels individuals,
to communicate with a wider and more diverse group of peers than is likely to be present in,
for instance, familial or friendship groups (Granovetter 1986; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995;
Mutz and Mondak 2006). As in other institutional contexts that structure social interactions,
individuals within forced-interaction settings develop a shared understanding of the types of
public communication that are socially acceptable with respect to a broad spectrum of social
referents (Mead 1934), including race and racial equality. Through repeated interpersonal
interactions accompanied by positive and negative social reinforcement (e.g., Bandura 1977),
individuals internalize norms of socially acceptable public speech with respect to race that
may or may not be in line with their actual racial attitudes. When called upon to make
public pronouncements about race or racial equality, if behavioral norms and true attitudes
are in tension, individuals must then balance preferences for stating what they truly believe
with preferences for not appearing deviant from their broader social group.
2.3 The Model
I now present a model of the public expression of attitudes with respect to sensitive so-
cial issues that accounts for the features of non-homophilic social interactions structured by
institutions and the preferences of individuals to conform to the behaviors of others with
whom they are socially connected. The purpose is to capture the types of intimate interac-
tions that are forced upon individuals within institutional and organizational settings such
as schools and workplaces. Following Akerlof (1980) and Jones (1984), I represent the social
status of agents by the utility that they derive from behaving in accordance with others. But
as in Bernheim (1994) and Kuran (1995), preferences for conformity must be balanced by
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preferences to exhibit behavior that is consistent with internal values.1 The model will inten-
tionally take on an abstract quality, but the intention is to provide a reasonable explanation
for an important aspect of the dynamics of rhetorical norms described above.
Formally, let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents represented as the nodes of a graph,
g ∈ G (N), where G (N) is the set of all undirected graphs on N . Further, let Ni (g) ⊂ N
be agent i’s neighborhood of direct connections. Agent i ∈ N is characterized by a fixed
scalar vi ∈ [0, 1] representing preferences over a behavior, bi ∈ {0, 1}, that is observable for
all j ∈ Ni (g). In the vein of the previous discussion, we may think of agents as having
more or less well defined preferences for racial equality or racial inequality (or egalitarianism
or inegalitarianism with respect to some other sensitive social issue). If bi = 1 indicates
a public pronouncement of agent i in favor of, say, egalitarianism, and bi = 0 in favor of
inegalitarianism, then we may think of vi > 0.5 as representing an internal preference for
egalitarianism and vi < 0.5 as representing an internal preference for inegalitarianism.
Each agent in the population is compelled to select some publicly observable behavior
b ∈ B ≡ {0, 1}. Agents have intrinsic preferences over B represented by the payoff function
f (bi, vi), where f (·) achieves a maximum when vi = bi and is assumed to be symmetric.
In addition, agents have extrinsic preferences over B represented by the payoff function
h (bi, φi, g), where h (·) achieves a maximum at bi = φi and is assumed to be symmetric,
and where φi is a summary representation of agent i’s estimate of the behaviors of others
in her neighborhood of direct connections2 (to be explained below). Given the assumptions
imposed on f (·) and h (·), a convenient representation is to let f (bi, vi) = − (bi − vi)2 and
h (bi, φi, g) = − (bi − φi)2. Agent i chooses bi to solve arg maxbi∈B U (bi, vi, φi, g), where
U (bi, vi, φi, g) = αf (bi, vi) + (1− α)h (bi, φi, g)
= −α (bi − vi)2 − (1− α) (bi − φi)2 ,
(2.1)
1In other words, the balance is between conformity with others and consistency between internal values
and expressed behavior. For a similar take on a different phenomenon, Bednar et al. (2010) and Page, Sander,
and Schneider-Mizell (2007) use the same terminology of conformity and consistency to develop models of
the balance between conformity with others and internal consistency across a variety of issue dimensions.
2The term “neighborhood of direct connections” can be substituted with the term “group.” Given the
choice of notation, I will use the language of graph/social network theory.
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where α ∈ [0, 1] is a relative weighting parameter determining the value that agents place on
publicly expressing their internal preferences as compared to the value that they place on
not appearing deviant from their immediate social group. In other words, α is the relative
weight given to cognitive consonance as opposed to social consonance. Additionally, the
additive form of U (·) shows that it is simply a convex combination of weighted intrinsic and
extrinsic payoffs.
For a specified number of time steps, agents are ordered according to their social status
as determined by their extrinsic payoff in the previous period, and in this order each agent
chooses an observable behavior. Allowing social status to determine the order in which
agents publicly express an opinion on a sensitive social issue can be thought to capture
concepts such as boldness or confidence. Let S ≡ σ (N) = (s1, . . . , sn) be a permutation
of N that lists agents in descending order according to their status. For example, suppose
in a population of three agents that agent 3 has the highest status, agent 1 the second
highest, and agent 2 the lowest. We would then have S ≡ (s1, s2, s3) = (3, 1, 2). In a given
time step, after each agent sj chooses bsj her action is observable by all other agents in
her neighborhood of direct connections, denoted Nsj (g). Therefore, any agent sk such that
j < k and sj ∈ Nsk (g) will be able to incorporate the observation of bsj into her estimate of
the distribution of behaviors in the neighborhood, φsk . Formally, let mi be the total number
of agents in the neighborhood of direct connections for agent i. Then, at time step t, agent
i = sk develops an estimate of the distribution of behaviors in her neighborhood according
to the following rule:
φsk,t =
1
msk − 1
 ∑
j<k:sj∈Nsk (g)
bsj ,t
+ ]{j > k : sj ∈ Nsj (g)}pt−1
 , (2.2)
where psk,t−1 is the mean of the observable behaviors among other agents in the population
in the previous time step. Specifically,
pt−1 =
1
n
∑
j∈N
bj,t−1.
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Substantively, the form of φsk shows that agents are establishing an estimate of the distribu-
tion of behaviors in their neighborhood of direct connections by observing others who have
gone before them in the current round, and combining this with the information from the
entire population in the previous round.
After all agents in N choose a behavior to solve arg maxbi∈B U (bi, vi, φi, g), each receives
an actual payoff of U (bi, vi, p, g). That is, the extrinsic payoff actually received is based
on the average behavior of other agents rather than the mere estimate employed to choose
behavior. Agents’ extrinsic payoffs in time t then determine the order in which agents choose
behavior in time t+ 1, and so on. The operation of the model dynamics can be summarized
as follows:
1. Define N = {1, . . . , n} and choose g ∈ G (N) and a group size, k;
2. For each i in 1 through n, assign vi ∈ [0, 1], and an initial social status, q0 ∈ [0, 1];
3. Define S = σ (N) = (s1, . . . , sn) so that agents are placed in descending order according
to their social status;
4. Agents s1 through sn calculate φsj and choose bsj to solve arg maxb∈B U
(
bsj , vsj , φsj , g
)
;
5. Agents receive payoff U (bi, vi, pi, g) and h (bi, pi, g) becomes agent i’s current status;
6. Repeat steps 3 through 5.
2.4 Example Model Dynamics
To unpack the black-box aspect of the above description, I now present an illustration of the
one-period dynamics of the model for a contrived example population. Figure 2.1 presents
an example population of 8 agents, with a neighborhood or group size of 4. In this example,
agents 1 through 4 form one group and agents 5 through 8 form a second group. Agent
preferences, vi, and social status in the previous period, hi,t−1, are presented above or below
the respective nodes.
From the graphical presentation in Figure 2.1, the network structure of the population
becomes clear. Groups are actually fully connected island cliques embedded in the larger
population. That is, within groups, all members are connected to all other members, and
there is no overlapping membership between the several groups. Additionally, note that the
subscripts indicate that agents’ social statuses are indexed by time, while their preferences
13
Figure 2.1: Example Population with n = 8 and k = 4
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
v1 =
h1,t−1 =
 0.288
−0.224
v2 =
h2,t−1 =
 0.788
−0.272
v3 =
h3,t−1 =
 0.409
−0.022
v4 =
h4,t−1 =
 0.883
−0.273
v5 =
h5,t−1 =
 0.940
−0.161
v6 =
h6,t−1 =
 0.046
−0.214
v7 =
h7,t−1 =
 0.528
−0.449
v8 =
h8,t−1 =
 0.892
−0.050
Note: Nodes represent agents. Numbers in nodes index agent identities; vi are agent preferences, which are static; hi,t−1 are
agents’ extrinsic utility and social status earned in the previous period. See text for details.
are not. Though it is plausible to think that individual preferences are subject to change
over time, the simple formulation examined here is intended to capture behavioral dynamics
over a relatively brief span of time. Hence, preferences are assumed to be static. Social
status, on the other hand, changes each round as a function of each agent’s behavior in
relation to the behavior of their neighborhood of direct connections and that of the broader
population.
In this particular example, agents begin with a social status determined by the behav-
iors exhibited in the previous period. Given the values of h1 through h8, the permuta-
tion that places agents in descending order according to social status is S ≡ σ (N) =
(3, 8, 5, 6, 1, 2, 4, 7). Further, assume that in the previous round, 3 out of the 8 agents ex-
hibited behavior 1, so that p = 0.375. And for simplicity, assume that agents place equal
weight on expressing their true preference and on not appearing deviant from their social
group, so that α = 0.5. Given that agent 3 is compelled to be the first mover, she does
not have any information about the behavior in her neighborhood of direct connections in
the current period. She does, however, know the distribution of behaviors in the broader
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population in the previous time period. Therefore, armed with a weak preference for behav-
ior 0 (v3 = 0.409), and the knowledge that 5 out of the eight agents exhibited behavior 0
in the previous period, there is no inherent conflict between internal and social preferences,
and after forming the estimate of φ3 agent 3 chooses behavior 0. After agent 3, agent 8 is
compelled to exhibit a behavior. Agent 8 is the second mover in the population, but the
first mover in her particular neighborhood of direct connections. Like agent 3, agent 8 uses
only her internal preference and the population distribution of behaviors in the previous
period to make her decision. In this case, however, a conflict arises because although agent
8 has a relatively strong preference for behavior 1 (v8 = 0.892), she knows that a majority
of agents in the previous period chose behavior 0. Agent 8 forms her estimate of neighbor-
hood connections, φ8, according to equation (2.2) and then solves arg maxbi∈B U (bi, vi, φi, g)
according to equation (2.1), finding that behavior 1 is the optimal choice. Agent 5 is then
compelled to exhibit a behavior, with the ability to account for the behavior of agent 8 in
the current period; then agent 6, with the ability to account for the behaviors of agents 5
and 8; then agent 1, with the ability to account for the behavior of agent 3; then agent 2,
with the ability to account for the behaviors of agents 1 and 3; followed by agents 4 and 7,
each with the ability to account for the behaviors of all of their fellow group members.
In each period of the model, each agent i, in order according to her social status, simply
estimates φi and then uses that estimate to choose bi to optimize equation (2.1). Then, after
each agent exhibits a behavior, they earn an actual extrinsic utility that is based on their
own behavior in relation to the behaviors of the population at large. Extrinsic utility then
becomes agents’ social status, and they begin the next iteration in the order determined
by that social status. Table 2.1 summarizes the one-period dynamics for the population
illustrated in Figure 2.1.
As in the previous period with which this example began, we again see that three agents
exhibit behavior 1 and five exhibit behavior 0. Further, if the behaviors of individual agents
are matched to their internal preferences shown in Figure 2.1, we see that agents 2 and 4
exhibit behavior 0 even though they have an intrinsic preference for behavior 1. At least two
features of the setup lead to this outcome. First, agents 2 and 4 have lower social status than
their fellow group member, agent 3, who has a preference for behavior 0. Second, agents 2
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Table 2.1: One-Period Dynamics for Example Population
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 Step 7 Step 8
i φi bi φi bi φi bi φi bi φi bi φi bi φi bi φi bi
1 — — — — 0.20 0 0.20 0 0.20 0 0.20 0
2 — — — — — 0.77 0 0.77 0 0.77 0
3 0.30 0 0.30 0 0.30 0 0.30 0 0.30 0 0.30 0 0.30 0 0.30 0
4 — — — — — — 0.00 0 0.00 0
5 — — 0.53 1 0.53 1 0.53 1 0.53 1 0.53 1 0.53 1
6 — — — 0.77 0 0.77 0 0.77 0 0.77 0 0.77 0
7 — — — — — — — 0.67 1
8 — 0.30 1 0.30 1 0.30 1 0.30 1 0.30 1 0.30 1 0.30 1
and 4 know that the majority behavior in the previous period was behavior 0. Combining
both of these facts, when agent 2 acts she knows that one of her fellow group members
exhibited behavior 0 in the current period and that the majority of the population at large
exhibited behavior 0 in the previous period, and therefore herself earns greater estimated
utility for exhibiting behavior 0 because of the desire to not appear deviant. Then when agent
3 acts, she knows that two of her fellow group members exhibited behavior 0 in the current
period and, again, that the majority of the population exhibited behavior 0 in the previous
period. Agent 3, too, estimates that her utility would be higher by choosing behavior 0.
Just like the problem of cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma-type settings, if agents 2 and 4
could coordinate their behavior, they could together alter the majority behavior to be in line
with their own preferences. But the uncertainty about others’ intrinsic preferences and the
desire to not appear deviant lead them to falsify those preferences by acting in an opposed
fashion.
2.5 Numerical Experiments
A set of numerical experiments were constructed to explore variation in some of the key
features of individual-level preferences and social context that are expected to impact the
distribution of behaviors in the population over time. With a chosen population size, n,
and group size, k, graphs were constructed so that each agent was assigned to a group of
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size k or less.3 The resulting networks take the form of those presented in Figure 2.1. In
these numerical experiments, the purpose of random assignment to groups is to capture non-
homophilic interactions, and the purpose of random assignment to island-cliques is to capture
an important feature of schools, workplaces, and other institutional and organizational social
settings that structure interpersonal interactions. That is, institutions composed of many
actors structure interactions around tasks that must be performed, and those tasks will
call for some interactions between individuals to be very intimate and others to range from
casual to non-existent. The particular network structures used to investigate the social
dynamics employ the simplification that groups of individuals are intimately connected and
there is no cross-group membership. This captures certain important features of situations
like work groups, which structure short-term interpersonal relationships between individuals
embedded within the same institutions.
For all of the experiments described herein, initial agent populations were constructed by
drawing the vector (v1, . . . , vn), where vi ∼ Unif (0, 1). As stated previously, this vector of
characteristics remained static. In addition, each population under consideration took on
assumed values of n, k, and α, which were varied across simulations (to be explained below).
To begin the iterative process, the initial social status of agents was determined by agent
preferences, vi (and therefore was also randomly assigned). And from this starting point,
the behaviors and social statuses of the agents were allowed to develop endogenously. The
model was then allowed to iterate for a specified number of time periods and the behavior
was examined.
2.5.1 Results
For the simulations that follow, the population size, n, was allowed to vary between 50 and
200 (taking values of 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, and 200), the group size, k, was allowed to
vary between 3 and 10 (increasing in increments of 1), and the weight placed on internal
consistency, α, was allowed to vary between 0.1 and 0.9 (increasing in increments of 0.1).
3Agents in a given population were assigned to groups of size less than k only if the ratio of n to k was
not integer valued. For instance, suppose n = 50 and k = 4. In this case, agents would be assigned to 12
groups of size 4, and the 2 remaining agents would be assigned to a final group of size 2.
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Figure 2.2: Example System Dynamics for n = 70, k = 5, 500 Simulations, and 100 Itera-
tions, Allowing α to Vary
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Note: Each panel represents the average behavior (the proportion of agents exhibiting behavior 1) across 500 simulations for
the given set of parameter values. Thin lines are the average behavior for individual simulations. Thick lines are the average
behavior across the 500 simulations.
For each initial set of parameters, 500 simulations were run for 100 iterations. To take an
initial look at the system dynamics over time, Figure 2.2 presents an illustration that holds
n constant at 70, k constant at 5, and allows α to vary over its range.4 In each panel, the
thin lines represent the average behavior of the population at each iteration for each of the
500 simulated runs of the model. The thick black line is the average at each iteration across
the 500 simulations.
The pattern exhibited for this choice of n and k is indicative of the general pattern that
emerges for any given choice of n and k. That is, for any value of α less than 0.5, the system
almost always quickly settles into an equilibrium in which all of the agents exhibit one or
the other of the behaviors. Substantively, this makes perfect intuitive sense and is not at all
surprising. Because α captures the weight that agents place on internal consistency, that is,
exhibiting a behavior that is consistent with their true preferences, low values of α should
be associated with greater levels of conformity and preference falsification. Since internal
4The results for α = 0.1 are omitted for presentation purposes, but suffice to say that the results are very
similar to those for α = 0.2.
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preferences are random draws across the range of possible preferences, about half of the
agents should hold a preference for behavior 1 and about half should hold a preference for
behavior 0, on average and over the long run. Therefore, equilibria in which all agents exhibit
one behavior are the outcomes with the highest levels of conformity. As α increases from
0.2 to 0.4, the number of iterations required for the system to fall into equilibrium increases
slightly, but all simulated populations eventually do fall into an all-0 or all-1 steady state.
Further, the location of the mean trend line indicates that there does not seem to be any
inherent bias in the system leading to more choices of behavior 0 or behavior 1.
As we move to the situation in which agents place equal weight on their desires to express
their own internal preferences and their desires to not appear deviant from the group, that
is, when α = 0.5, the general behavior of the system becomes more difficult to assess. A
substantial proportion of the simulated runs fall into equilibria in which all agents exhibit
behavior 0 or all agents exhibit behavior 1. But at least two characteristics are clearly
different from the system dynamics for α ≤ 0.4. First, when simulated populations do fall
into an all-0 or all-1 equilibrium, there is no apparent pattern to when this happens. For
α ≤ 0.4 all simulated populations fall into one or other of these patterns prior to the twentieth
iteration of the model. For α = 0.5, however, populations are continually moving into an
all-0 or all-1 equilibrium throughout the 100 iterations. Additionally, whereas for α ≤ 0.4
all simulation runs quickly fall into one of these steady states, for α = 0.5 a substantial
proportion of the simulations remain in flux through the first 100 iterations. It is possible
many of these simulated populations would reach an all-0 or all-1 equilibrium if the system
had been allowed to iterate beyond 100 periods. But given the behavior exhibited, it is also
likely that many would continue to fluctuate indefinitely.
For α ≥ 0.6, the picture changes yet again. For these parameter values, no simulations of
the 500 reach an all-0 or all-1 equilibrium. To be sure, some simulated populations do reach
equilibria with a mix of behaviors in the population. But the conformity pressures are now
reduced to the point that lower proportions of agents are willing to falsify their preferences
in order to conform to the behaviors of others. As α increases from 0.6 to 0.9, the range of
values of average behavior tighten further and further around the mean of 0.5. Again, the
substantive interpretation of what is happening is quite intuitive. The pressure to conform
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to a view that runs counter to one’s preferences is a direct function of the strength with
which they hold the desire to maintain internal consistency. Values of α greater than 0.5
mean that agents value expressing a view that is consistent with internal preferences more
than they value consistency with proximate others who can witness their behavior.
As stated previously, the pattern of results in Figure 2.2 is not particular to the chosen
values of n and k. With little exception, this is the pattern that holds for any values of n and
k that could be chosen. But for α values greater than 0.4, it becomes difficult to ascertain
just how many steady states are achieved among the 500 simulations. Close examination of
the plots reveals a great deal of fluctuation across the first 100 iterations for many of the
simulations. To get a better sense of how many populations do in fact achieve a steady state
for a given set of parameter values, Figure 2.3 presents the proportion of the 500 simulations
for each set of starting parameter values that reach equilibrium prior to the 90th iteration.5
That is, to be included in the proportions presented here, a population had to be in a steady
state for at least 10 periods.
As shown previously, for α = 0.4, 100% of the simulated populations fall into equilibria.
Additionally, for α = 0.5, a very high proportion of the populations eventually move into
equilibrium. And with few exceptions, there appears to be an emergent pattern in which
the proportion of equilibria reached is an increasing function of group size. That is, when
agents place equal weight on expressing their true preference and not appearing deviant from
their social group, it tends to be the case that the greater the number of individuals in one’s
immediate social group, the greater is the propensity to fall into a state of clear, predictable
behavior from which agents do not deviate. This is not something that necessarily would
have been predicted ahead of time, but it makes intuitive sense upon reflection. Essentially,
the larger the proportion of the broader population that the individual agent has more
intimate interactions with, the more likely they are to begin to mirror the behavior of one
another and become highly predictable.
When α increases beyond 0.5, yet another interesting pattern is revealed. Specifically,
moving from α = 0.5 to α = 0.6, the proportion of simulated populations that reaches
5Results for values of α ≤ 0.3 are not presented because they are identical to the results for α = 0.4.
Results for values of n = 200 are excluded due to space considerations.
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Figure 2.3: Proportions of Simulations that Reach a Steady-State Equilibrium
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Figure continued on next page.
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Figure 2.3: Proportions of Simulations that Reach a Steady-State Equilibrium (continued
from previous page)
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Note: For a given set of parameter values, bar heights represent the proportion of simulations out of 500 that reach a constant
population equilibrium behavior prior to the 90th iteration of the system.
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equilibrium drops off dramatically, from almost 0 when n = 50 or n = 60 to exactly 0 when
n ≥ 70. Increasing to α = 0.7, the proportion generally decreases even further or remains
steady. But when α increases to 0.8, the proportion of simulated populations reaching
equilibrium begins to increase. And when α moves from 0.8 to 0.9, the increase in the
proportion is quite dramatic. That is, as agents move from holding only a slight preference
for conformity over consistency to an overwhelming preference for consistency, the behavior
of the population at large becomes more and more predictable. This is also something that
was not predicted prior to observing the simulation results, but that can be explained easily
upon further reflection. The high values of α indicate a stronger preference for expressing
views that are consistent with one’s internal preferences. Therefore, equilibria at high levels
of α are likely due to a relatively large number of groups composed of like-minded individuals
expressing their true preferences. This idea is further supported by the relationship between
the population size and the number of equilibria achieved, while holding k and α constant.
To see this, scanning down the panels of Figure 2.3, we see that for, say, α = 0.9 and any
given value of k, the number of simulated populations that reach equilibrium decreases as
n increases. If the above explanation is correct, through random sampling it should be
expected that agents with similar values of vi will occasionally end up assigned to groups
together at relatively high rates in the population. When this occurs, public compliance
between group members is not a result of a strong drive for not appearing deviant, but it
nonetheless mirrors what would be expected when that drive is strong. As the population
size increases, sampling will still lead to some groups composed of like-minded agents, but
the rate at which this occurs will decrease on average. And this is exactly what is borne
out by the results. As n increases from 100 to 200 (not presented), the number of simulated
populations that reach equilibria falls to nearly 0 for all values of α ≥ 0.6.
The claim being made to explain the pattern of equilibrium behavior across simulations is
the intuitive one that steady states achieved with values of α ≤ 0.5 will tend to be composed
of a relatively large proportion of individual agents who are falsifying their preferences and
simply complying with an established group and/or population behavior because they have
a strong desire to not appear deviant. For α ≥ 0.6, however, equilibria will largely be
composed of groups of like-minded individual agents exhibiting behaviors that are generally
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Figure 2.4: Boxplots of Average Proportion of Agents who Falsify Preferences for n = 50,
Allowing α and k to Vary
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Note: Boxplots are of the average number of agents who falsify their preferences when n = 50 and α and k take on the values
displayed in each panel. Averages were calculated within simulations across the first 100 iterations of the model, then these
averages were themselves averaged across the 500 simulations.
in line with their internal preferences. To further buttress this idea, Figure 2.4 presents a
summary of the distributions of the average proportion of agents who falsify their preferences
across simulations when n = 50. That is, for n = 50, and for any values of k and α, the
average number of agents who falsify their preferences over 100 iterations of the model were
calculated, and these averages themselves were averaged over the 500 simulations run for
each set of parameter values. The panels in Figure 2.4 display boxplots of those average
proportions. The population size of n = 50 was chosen merely for illustrative purposes, but
other population values not displayed lead to very similar results, with the major difference
being that the range of the average proportion tends to decrease as population size increases.
The pattern displayed in the boxplots is exactly what would be expected. For α ≤ 0.5
we find the highest levels of individuals who falsify their preferences when they exhibit a
behavior, and this level remains relatively constant between α = 0.1 and α = 0.5. At α = 0.5,
the range of the proportion of falsifiers begins to increase sharply, but the maximum value
rarely goes above 0.5 and never goes above 0.6. At α = 0.7, the range remains large, but
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the densest portion of the distribution decreases dramatically. The median and the range
of the distribution continue to decrease as α increases to 0.9. Taken by itself, Figure 2.4
presents the intuitive and expected result that when agents place more emphasis on internal
consistency, they are less likely to falsify their behavior. But taken together with the results
displayed in Figure 2.3, the clear result is that when α > 0.5, as the proportion of agents
falsifying their behavior decreases to near 0, the number of simulated populations that reach
an equilibrium increases substantially. This indicates that when agents place more weight on
the intrinsic utility of exhibiting behavior consistent with internal preferences, the proportion
of groups exhibiting similar behavior in any given population tends to increase, while the
number of people who falsify what they prefer simultaneously decreases.
The results presented thus far summarize the types of behavior that we can expect to
play out on average over a range of different circumstances. Intuitively, when agents care
less about expressing their true preferences, more agents tend to falsify their preferences
in order to conform to the behaviors of others. And when this conformity occurs in larger
numbers, more of the simulated populations carry on the conformity from period to period
in steady-state equilibria. Decisions of how to behave are based partially on the estimated
utility generated by pressure to conform to those in one’s group who have already chosen a
behavior in the current round, as well as an estimate of how the remaining members of the
group will behave based on the distribution of behaviors in the broader population in the
previous iteration. But after all agents have chosen a behavior, the actual utility that they
receive is based on actual behaviors exhibited, rather than estimates.
To summarize the utility gains that agents receive from under various circumstances, I
once again employ an example population value and examine a summary of the distributions
across values of k and α. I do so because, again, the same relationship seems to hold across
values of n. Figure 2.5 presents summary distributions of the average utility earned across
the 500 simulations for the experiments in which n was set equal to 100. These utility
calculations are again the average of the average utility for each simulated population across
the 100 iterations. Interestingly, little variation in utility is exhibited for different values of
k. This indicates that the intimacy of the group interactions has little explanatory power
for the amount of benefit that agents receive when putting their behavior on public display.
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Figure 2.5: Boxplots of Average Utility of Agents for n = 100, Allowing α and k to Vary
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Note: Boxplots are of the average utility of agents when n = 100 and α and k take on the values displayed in each panel.
Averages were calculated within simulations across the first 100 iterations of the model, then these averages were themselves
averaged across the 500 simulations.
Interestingly, for any given group size, the greatest level of average utility is generally received
when agents place the lowest amount of weight on the internal consistency portion of their
utility calculations. As that weight increases from α = 0.1 to α = 0.6, the variability of
average utilities increases while their central tendency decreases. This is not unexpected,
given the underlying assumptions of the model. Across the simulated populations, internal
preferences are randomly assigned and remain static over time, whereas extrinsic utilities,
or social statuses, are allowed to develop endogenously subject to initial conditions. It is
reasonable to think that as agents place more and more weight on the portion of their utility
calculation that is a function of unchanging parameter values, they will also have less and
less control over utility maximization at the margins.
When the weight increases from α = 0.6 to α = 0.9, however, the average utility of
the simulated populations begins to increase slightly. That is, when agents place less and
less weight on the utility of conforming to the group behavior, away from the situation of
equal weight on intrinsic and extrinsic preferences, the population seems to benefit more
on average. This increase is only slight, but it is also somewhat unexpected. The likely
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explanation for this result is that when the weights placed on intrinsic and extrinsic utility
are closer to parity, agents will more often find themselves in circumstances in which they
see the benefit in changing their own responses from the previous period, and they will
therefore more often be attempting to achieve marginal gains in social status from iteration
to iteration. Because all agents will find themselves in the same situation, there will simply
be more fluctuation in population behavior from period to period, and therefore greater
uncertainty in the estimates of the population behavior on which they partially construct
their decisions. This explanation is further buttressed by the results presented in Figure 2.3,
where I previously noted that the number of simulated populations that fall into a steady-
state equilibria is often trivial at mid-range values of α.
Further, we can also examine the question of how well agents who falsify their preferences
fare in these simulated dynamics. To that end, Figure 2.6 presents the summary distributions
of average utilities for the same population size as presented in Figure 2.5 (n = 100), but
only for those agents in the population who falsified their preferences. Given that agents
could potentially change their behavior from period to period, taking an average for each
simulated population over the 100 iterations does not make sense in this case. The summary
distributions are therefore taken at iteration number 50.6 And, again, suffice to say the
choice of n size on which to focus did not change the general statements that can be made
about the system dynamics as k and α vary.
For preferences falsifiers, Figure 2.6 shows that the same general pattern exhibited across
values of k holds as with the population at large, but it does so at a lower level of utility. In
other words, as expected, falsifiers tend to earn less utility on average than non-falsifiers. For
α = 0.1, the difference in central tendency between falsifiers and the population at large is
only slight, but as α increases to 0.2 and greater, the differences in utility become far more
substantial. However, when focusing only on preference falsifiers, it is still the case that
when α increases from 0.6 to 0.9, the central tendency of the utility also increases slightly.
And here a similar explanation holds. Given the low proportions of simulated populations
6Summary distributions were examined at a variety of chosen iterations, and there was little variation in
results. The exception to this general statement is that there tended to be greater variability exhibited at
earlier iterations.
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Figure 2.6: Boxplots of Average Utility of Agents who Falsify Their Preferences for n = 100,
Allowing α and k to Vary
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Note: Boxplots are of the average utility of agents who falsify their internal preferences when n = 100 and α and k take on the
values displayed in each panel. Averages were calculated within simulations across the first 100 iterations of the model, then
these averages were themselves averaged across the 500 simulations.
falling into equilibria at values of α around 0.6 and 0.7, the fluctuations in behavior from
iteration to iteration mean that a steady and substantial proportion of the population are
falsifying their preferences from period to period, each in reaction to the fluctuations in the
population at large. This, in turn, creates greater uncertainty and poorer estimates of the
behavior of others, and hence lower extrinsic utility on average. What holds for the larger
population also holds for the preference falsifiers specifically. As agents place greater weight
on intrinsic utility, behaviors become more predictable on average, and agents are better
able to predict the social status they will obtain by exhibiting a certain behavior, and hence
increase their social status at the margins.
2.6 Discussion
The model and numerical experiments are admittedly very abstract, but the intention is to
capture an important, if stylized, set of characteristics of cognitive and social dynamics that
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govern interpersonal communication in non-homophilic social settings. Among the most
visible social changes in recent history is the shift in norms regarding the social acceptability
of racist or bigoted public speech. This is a change that has permeated both elites and
masses, as well as members of all social classes. Whereas in a previous era, norms of socially
acceptable public speech dictated that whites in most settings should publicly espouse the
superiority of whites over other races, by the last decade of the twentieth century this norm
had completely reversed, and remains so today. In the current social and political climate,
espousing any view other than complete racial equality is a dangerous endeavor that can lead
to a permanently tarnished reputation. Regardless of what individuals may truly believe,
expressions consistent with the ideas that one race is inherently superior to another, or
that the traditional white hierarchy should be maintained, are now wholly unacceptable in
almost all white social circles. It is clear that expressions in favor of racial inequality may
occur and remain acceptable within self-selected groups of like-minded individuals, but in
the types of interpersonal interactions that make up the bulk of day-to-day interpersonal
communications for most individuals, they simply are not. The historical trajectory of this
change is difficult to summarize in a concise manner, having been subject to wide geographic
and temporal variability, but it can safely be claimed that the pace of change in the latter
half of the twentieth century was particularly brisk. Coinciding with that brisk change
was a monumental shift in public policies with respect to institutions that structure social
interactions.
In this chapter, I have attempted to provide a formal account of some of the underlying
individual and structural mechanisms that could have plausibly brought about such changes.
The model presented above provides a simplified representation of the types of social inter-
actions that I claim were largely responsible for structuring the witnessed changes in norms
of rhetoric, that is, everyday interactions within organizational settings. The key feature of
those interactions is that they are non-homophilic. When combined with individual pref-
erences for conformity, non-homophilic interactions are expected to carry the potential for
individuals forced to express an opinion on a sensitive social issue to potentially put forth
a view that is dissonant with internal preferences. If such a phenomenon takes place on a
wide scale, the general implication is that norms of public discourse can shift in such a way
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that a substantial proportion of individuals that make up a given population consistently
express opinions that differ from what they truly believe.
I attempted to capture these substantive dynamics by considering the notion of a dichoto-
mous choice of behavior, where the dichotomy can be thought of substantively as the choice
of exhibiting a behavior that is consistent with racial equality or consistent with racial in-
equality. In the model, agents are compelled to choose one behavior or the other, and they
have a desire to both behave in a way that is consistent with their own internal values, but
also to not appear deviant from their immediate social groups. Because individuals in the
model act in sequence, and because networks of direct social connections were randomly
assigned, the two desires often found themselves in tension. And this tension, I contend,
is an ubiquitous feature of population-level social interactions. In other words, in the real
world, when behavior with respect to some issue takes on a dichotomous-choice nature, yet
underlying preferences are expected to be nuanced and variable, it is clear that widespread
falsification of internal preferences may result. In the case of sensitive social issues, this is
no doubt expected.
Many of the results of the numerical experiments were quite intuitive and predictable ahead
of time. For instance, the results bore out the idea that as the weight that agents place on
the utility from internal consistency increases, the preponderance of preference falsification
decreases. Beyond a certain level, no simulated populations moved into equilibria in which
all of the agents exhibited one behavior or the other. In other words, when agents placed
greater value on exhibiting behavior consistent with internal preferences, there remained a
substantial mix of behaviors in the population. Relating these results to the substantive
situation of the change in rhetorical norms regarding race, if the model presented here holds
any relation to the real world, it must be the case that the desire to not appear deviant
is in fact quite strong. In other words, as discussed previously, the United States in the
twenty-first century is a society in which the race question has been settled in the court
of expressed public opinion. That is, to the extent that public behavior with respect to
race can be boiled down to a dichotomous choice between a preference for equality and a
preference for inequality, behavior is indeed skewed far to the side of equality. It may be the
case that high values of α may be realistic for some individuals, but not for broad swaths of
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the population at large.
Other results were not necessarily predictable ahead of time, but make sense upon further
reflection. For instance, when equal weight is placed on intrinsic and extrinsic preferences
(i.e., when α = 0.5), there is a general pattern in which the proportion of simulated popula-
tions that achieve equilibrium increases as the sizes of the groups to which they are assigned
increases. Substantively, larger group sizes mean that a larger proportion of the overall
population is in an intimate social setting together in which behaviors directly influence one
another in any given current period. And the larger the public, the more uncertain are
predictions about the behavior and preferences of others from which a given agent derives
utility. Relating this back to the substantive example, the more proximate others who are
able to witness an agent’s behavior, the more uncertain agents will tend to be in estimating
the extent of preferences for racial (in)equality in the network of direct connections. In these
instances, more individuals will tend to look to the previous behavior of the population at
large in deciding what behavior to exhibit. From there, it is straightforward to surmise that
this will more often lead to equilibrium behavior in one direction or the other, depending
largely on the initial distribution of vi in the population. In the simulations, both behaviors
were given an equal chance to develop, on average and over time. But for the real-world ex-
ample of racial rhetoric, it is likely the case that over time, social interactions outside of the
organizational settings in which individuals experienced the bulk of their non-homophilic
social interactions would have led the starting values in the population eventually to be
biased toward the behavior representing racial equality.
Additionally, the average utilities of both the population at large as well as the falsifiers
in the population suggest that, on average, agents gain more utility by being on either end
of the internal consistency weight scale. In other words, high and low values of α lead to
greater average utility levels than mid-range values. As discussed previously, higher average
utility levels are associated with higher proportions of steady-state behaviors. At both ends
of the α spectrum, relatively more equilibria are achieved across simulated populations, but
the reasons differ. When agents place little weight on being internally consistent, steady
behavioral states occur because they simply conform to the behaviors of first movers. When
agents place a great deal of weight on being internally consistent, steady behavioral states
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occur because like-minded individuals are randomly assigned to groups together at relatively
high rates. In either case, agents receive a relatively high level of utility on average because
they either do not care what others think, or they care, but they simply happen to get
assigned to proximate others with similar values. Given the substantive situation of interest
here, it is clear that taking averages and assigning the same value of α for all agents is an
oversimplification. In the real world, it is highly likely that substantial proportions of the
population exhibited high, mid-range, and low values for internal consistency. Those with
high values are likely to have been the uncompromising first movers whose behaviors led to
wider-scale change.
2.7 Conclusion
In the end, the model presented in this chapter is only a start as to capturing the most im-
portant processes underlying norm development, transition, and transmission. Much further
work is required to bring together the appropriate set of micro-level cognitive elements and
features of social interactions that will be able to generally describe the change in norms
with respect to racial equality in the United States.
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Chapter 3
Laboratory Evidence on Social Influence
Scholarly thought on the interpersonal underpinnings of social influence processes is but-
tressed by compelling theoretical accounts and anecdotal evidence, but little in the way of
systematic empirical demonstrations. At least one reason for the dearth of empirical research
is that tapping the differences between true and expressed attitudes is exceedingly difficult
in practice. In the pursuit of measuring internal attitudes, we are faced with external ex-
pressions of attitudes; in the pursuit of detecting social pressure effects, we are typically
without observations of individuals embedded within social settings.
Take as one example the phenomenon of social desirability bias in the measurement of
racial attitudes. If one examines, for instance, white attitudes toward blacks over large
swaths of time in the United States, a clear trend will emerge in which expressed negative
attitudes exhibit a marked decrease (see, e.g., Schuman et al. 1998). In any thoughtful
account, interpretations of this trend will be accompanied by statements of caution about
changing social mores that govern the social acceptability of expressions of negative racial
attitudes. The standard, plausible, interpretation is that likely many respondents to any
given poll or survey are masking their true attitudes and simply giving the researcher the
perceived socially acceptable response. That is, the social customs of a particular time and
place dictate a certain level of perceived social acceptability of negative racial attitudes of
whites toward blacks, that level has decreased over time, and individuals whose true attitudes
are discordant with that level face perceived pressure to mask their views.
That interpretation will not be criticized here. It is, in fact, highly plausible and quite
compelling. But it is useful to note at least one phenomenon that it implies, and about which
we know very little empirically. That is, whether or not the distribution of racial attitudes
changed significantly over time, the mass public nonetheless internalized the change in norms
33
of socially acceptable public expression regarding race. But exactly how individuals came
to perceive a changing social climate, as well as their own place in that change, remains
empirically elusive.
Social desirability bias in the case of white racial attitudes is just one example of a general
phenomenon of norm change and internalization. Similar transformations have been wit-
nessed with respect to gender, various religious and ethnic groups, homosexuals, and so on.
With respect to each of these cases, we can reasonably surmise that there is a general un-
derstanding among the populations of most institutionalized democracies that expressions
of egalitarianism constitute the appropriate social response in most circumstances. That
is, norms governing appropriate public discourse are such that in order to avoid appearing
deviant from one’s peers, expressions of equality between groups are a safer bet than any
justifications or preferences for inequality. This implies that individuals perceive that a be-
lief in egalitarianism is the norm in the broader population. And the development of that
perception must have come through a process of learning and internalization over time.
When internally held attitudes and norms of appropriate discourse are in tension, public
expressions of attitudes may not be what they seem (e.g., Noelle-Neumann 1984). And
therein lies the rub for empirically oriented social scientists. Those interested in obtaining
valid measures of attitudes on sensitive social issues through self reports cannot be sure
that respondents are telling the truth. And those interested in the real-world dynamics of
the social influence processes themselves will have difficulty observing them because their
primary manifestation is likely to be in the form of everyday social interactions. In either
case, without a careful research design, these phenomena will continue to elude empirical
examination.
The present chapter examines the dynamics of social pressure effects in a laboratory set-
ting. For now, we will leave aside questions of whether the opinions that individuals express
on sensitive social matters represent their true, internally held, attitudes, and rather focus
attention on the dynamics of social influence. Specifically, examinations of social pressure
effects will be with respect to baseline attitudinal measures on sensitive social matters col-
lected in an isolated setting. Isolation is not expected to eliminate social desirability bias
stemming from researcher effects, but it is expected to provide a contrast with which to
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compare more direct forms of social pressure exerted in peer-group settings. The chapter
proceeds as follows. In the next section, I present a summary of social scientific research
on social influence. In the subsequent section, I use the ideas from previous research to
draw a set of empirical hypotheses that can be tested in a laboratory setting. Following
this discussion, I describe the designs and results of two experimental studies that allow for
testing of the hypotheses. Finally, I offer concluding remarks.
3.1 Social Influence
Scholars have long been familiar with the idea that when it comes to salient social issues,
individuals tend to be aware of whether there are norms of appropriate behavior that govern
the range of thought deemed socially acceptable (e.g., Crowne and Marlowe 1960; Kuran
1995; Mendelberg 2001; Noelle-Neumann 1984). It has also been widely theorized that
through interpersonal interactions, common knowledge of socially acceptable behavior can
exert social pressure on individuals to act according to behavioral norms (Festinger 1954;
Kelley 1952; Sherif 1936), even when such behavior is incongruent with preferences (Festinger
1957; Kuran 1989, 1991, 1995; MacKuen 1990). Everyday social interactions, therefore, act
as a type of social verification system that drives individuals in the same society toward
a shared understanding of the range of behaviors that are socially acceptable (Hardin and
Higgins 1996), if not actual perceptions of right and wrong.
3.1.1 General Notions of Social Influence
Individuals’ social surroundings can substantially affect how they come to understand the
political and social world (Hardin and Higgins 1996), and the mechanisms by which general
social influence can occur vary greatly. One line of research that has received a great deal
of attention by social scientists concerns the manner in which social context structures atti-
tudes and behaviors. Beginning with the basic notion that individual behavior is developed
through individual-environment interactions (e.g., Tingsen 1937), it is widely recognized
that an important part of that environment is the social context. Over long spans of in-
35
dividuals’ lives, they will find themselves embedded within a set of institutions, networks,
social groups, and so on, that for most practical analytical purposes can be considered static
(Granovetter 1985). The major mechanism by which context imparts social influence is by
limiting the number and structuring the types of opportunities for social interaction (Eulau
1986; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987). If we can safely assume that a significant proportion of
political talk that an individual engages in takes place in casual interactions between indi-
viduals who just happen to be proximate (MacKuen 1990; Verhulst and Levitan 2009), the
impact of social context in the development of true attitudes, perceptions of the attitudes
of others, and the social consequences of norm deviation would seem to be profound.
In addition to the immediate social context, individuals are also embedded within the
broader society. Mass media, public opinion, and salient social groups operate beyond the
bounds of individuals’ interpersonal environments. Exposure to mainstream media provides
individuals with information about the lines being drawn on salient political topics, the range
of acceptable points of elite debate on those topics, as well as measures and interpretations
of broad public opinion. Further, individual perceptions about the aggregate distribution of
preferences have been found to influence both the willingness to express an opinion (Noelle-
Neumann 1974, 1984) and, when willing, the direction of preferences expressed (Mutz 1998).
The cumulative impact of these exposures should be to instill in individuals a sense of
societal norms of appropriate social behavior. To actors within the current social climate of
the United States, at least one social rule that should be apparent is the notion of equality
between individuals, without respect to race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and so on. Regard-
less of one’s true preferences, it is clear that publicly espousing an inegalitarian view carries
with it greater risk of social costs than espousing an egalitarian view.
3.1.2 Social Influence Through Interpersonal Interactions
The media provide information about society at large and the social context structures our
exposure to others, but the bulk of social influence takes place through direct interpersonal
interactions. Within political science, studies of interpersonal influence have tended to fo-
cus on the direct effects of information filtering by opinion leaders (Katz 1957; Katz and
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Lazarsfeld 1955; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948), and information exchanges be-
tween peers (e.g., Ahn, Huckfeldt, and Ryan 2010; Barabas 2004; Huckfeldt and Sprague
1987; Mutz 2002) in altering attitudes and behaviors. Political scientists have paid less at-
tention to normative explanations, however (but see Verhulst and Levitan 2009). Without
any exchange of factual information, people still tend to draw on the attitudes and behaviors
of others as guideposts for the ranges of attitudes and behaviors that are socially appropriate
(Festinger 1954; Kelley 1952). In certain situations, individuals may have a sense that there
is truly a correct and incorrect attitude with respect to a given social referent, and that the
attitudes of one’s peers serve as a benchmark against which to evaluate the appropriateness
of their opinions (Burt 1987; Festinger 1954; Kelley 1952; Levitan and Visser 2008; Visser
and Mirabile 2004). In certain other situations, proximate others may serve as standards for
appropriate social behavior without regard to factual accuracy (Deutsch and Gerard 1955;
Kelley 1952).
3.1.3 Social Conformity
The particular type of social influence most relevant for the present study is social confor-
mity, that is, the tendency of individuals to publicly comply with a known or perceived group
opinion. Outside of political science, social conformity has been a well studied phenomenon.
Following Sherif (1935) and Asch (1951), a long line of research in social psychology and
related fields has demonstrated that social conformity is in fact empirically verifiable in the
laboratory. Sherif (1935, 1936) employed an optical illusion known as the autokinetic ef-
fect (Adams 1912), in which a stationary pinpoint of light is projected onto the wall of a
darkened room, and to almost all human observers, the light appears to move. Employing
confederates, Sherif demonstrated that experimental subjects were quite susceptible to the
power of suggestion with respect to judgments about how far the light had traveled. That is,
when subjects were placed in a group setting and asked to publicly express their estimation
of how far the light had traveled after confederates had already done so, the judgments of
subjects tended to fall in line with those of the confederates, even when the expressed judg-
ments of confederates were wildly different than baselines established in a control condition.
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The Sherif studies demonstrated that when humans are asked to express judgments about
relatively ambiguous phenomena, there is a strong tendency to look to the majority opinion
as a rule of thumb for the appropriate response.
But what about relatively unambiguous phenomena? Working in the tradition of Sherif
(1935, 1936), Asch (1951, 1952) examined social conformity in situations in which the judg-
ment task had clear right and wrong answers. Specifically, subjects in the Asch studies were
asked to express which among a set of drawn lines was identical in length to another drawn
line. Line lengths were purposely drawn so that subjects would easily be able to differenti-
ate their lengths, and subjects making the judgment in an isolated control condition rarely
expressed the wrong answer. Again, subjects were placed in a group setting and asked to ex-
press their judgment out loud, this time following a group of confederates who expressed the
wrong answer. Though a majority of subjects gave the correct response in this group con-
dition, a surprisingly large proportion of subjects gave the same wrong answer as the group
of confederates. Given little evidence that the subjects examined by Asch (1951, 1952) were
unsure about the correct answer, the results point to a strong tendency for humans in public
settings to conform to expectations about the appropriate social response.
While the results from the research programs spawned by Asch and Sherif are extremely
useful as the largest and most prominent collection of empirical evidence on small-group con-
formity, it is not clear whether the type of conformity demonstrated has a direct connection
to norms of public speech with respect to salient social referents (including attitudes about
the equality of salient social groups), which are the focus of the present study. In particular,
the typical decision-making task under examination in these studies is highly arbitrary, and
cannot reasonably be expected to carry any social significance for the subject outside of the
laboratory. In one way, this can be seen as a strength of the experimental designs in that
the researcher is able to eliminate subjects’ preconceived notions about particular referents.
In another way, however, if we consider those preconceptions to be worthy of study in their
own right, and if we consider the clear qualitative difference between expressed judgments on
arbitrary tasks and expressions of opinion on salient—and sometimes sensitive—attitudinal
measures, existing work on social conformity leaves open the question of how small-group
pressures might operate on norms of public speech regarding egalitarianism.
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3.2 Development of Hypotheses
The lines of research spawned by Asch and Sherif offer a jumping-off point from which to
develop a set of expectations about the impact of social pressure on individual expressions of
political attitudes. As discussed previously, the takeaway point from these lines of research is
that in ambiguous and unambiguous decision-making settings, experimental subjects exhibit
a strong tendency to look to the group majority as an indicator of the appropriate social
response. Individuals may not internalize the perceived group opinion as their own, but
avoidance of appearing deviant provides a strong incentive to publicly comply, nonetheless.
Again, however, though researchers in social psychology and related fields have tended to
couch the phenomena that they examine in terms of general descriptions of social norms,
decision-making, opinion formation, and so on, it is not completely clear that the types
of behavioral tasks that they examine provide a close analogue to expressed attitudes on
sensitive social issues, which are the focus of the present study. On the one hand, attitudes,
unlike lines drawn on index cards, are by their nature matters of opinion without a clear right
and wrong answer. If individuals, no matter how strongly they hold their own opinions, are
able to see that certain political questions are coupled with a range of potential responses
across which reasonable people might disagree, then the impact of social pressure to conform
to some perceived group opinion may be less than in unambiguous decision-making settings.
On the other hand, the lack of a clearly correct answer, as with the autokinetic effect, may
lead individuals to be even more susceptible to the power of suggestion by immediate peers.
Because previous research does not offer clear guidance in this respect, I will begin the
process of investigation by situating the expression of political attitudes on sensitive social
issues within the general framework of decision-making tasks examined by previous research
on social conformity. This decision leads to the following:
General Social Conformity Hypothesis 1: Individuals who are able to learn the
distribution of attitudes in their immediate peer group will exhibit a tendency to
publicly comply with the group opinion.
First note what General Social Conformity Hypothesis 1 is not saying. Specifically, there
is no inherent assumption that individuals who express attitudes in the absence of specific
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knowledge about the opinions of their peers are free from all social pressure. It is in fact
expected that individuals carry with them some notion of social expectations, and that being
forced to express an attitude to a researcher at all is often enough to invoke conformity
pressures. Knowledge of the distribution of attitudes among a proximate group of peers,
however, is expected to be stronger, and to manifest itself through dissipation or reversal of
biases exhibited in isolated response settings. That is, if a clear picture of the distribution
of expressed attitudes in the population can be established among individuals compelled
to express their attitudes in isolation, General Social Conformity Hypothesis 1 states that
groups of individuals can predictably be lured away from that population distribution if they
are compelled to give their attitudes publicly in the face of a group of peers whose expressed
attitudes are markedly different than those of the population.
While General Social Conformity Hypothesis 1 offers a prediction about what to expect
when comparing groups of individuals who express attitudes in isolation to groups of individ-
uals who express attitudes in public, it does not make a claim about individuals changing the
responses that they would otherwise give in another circumstance. Even if the expectation is
supported, we do not know whether specific individuals in the group of people compelled to
give their responses publicly would have given a different response if they happened to have
given their response in isolation. But if we continue to think about the expression of political
attitudes on sensitive social issues as just one example of the types of decision-making tasks
and norms of behavior examined by Asch and Sherif and their followers, it would seem to be
implied that individuals could be drawn away from their own true belief in the face of social
pressure to provide a different response. That is, if the same individual were compelled to
provide an attitude expression both in isolation and in the face of a proximate and opposed
group of peers, the group responses may provide a form of social pressure that leads individ-
uals to alter their responses between the public and private settings. This discussion leads
to the following:
General Social Conformity Hypothesis 2: When asked to first express an attitude
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privately, and then publicly in the face of a unanimously opposed majority, in-
dividuals will tend to alter their privately expressed attitude in order to publicly
comply with the unanimous group attitude.
We can imagine a situation in which individuals are compelled to give their opinion on a
social issue, and where they have some sense that this opinion will be kept private. Then
later, those same individuals are compelled to express their opinions on the same issue in a
group situation in which (1) there is no sense of privacy, and (2) the fellow group members
have unanimously given an opinion that is opposed to what the individual stated in private.
In this situation, General Social Conformity Hypothesis 2 predicts that the subject will
change the attitude that they previously expressed in order to conform to the group opinion.
General Social Conformity Hypothesis 1 and General Social Conformity Hypothesis 2 are
drawn directly from previous social conformity research. But as stated above, it is not clear
that political attitudes operate in the same way as arbitrary decision-making tasks. As has
been discussed, the inherently subjective nature of attitudes means that most people will
understand that there is no clear right or wrong answer. On most sensitive social issues,
however, there is a sense of what is and what is not appropriate to say publicly. So while
individuals could genuinely feel that reasonable people might disagree, they also carry the
looming feeling that publicly appearing deviant from the dominant opinion in the population
may carry with it social costs.
It has been argued convincingly elsewhere that when people hold conflicting cognitions,
they experience cognitive dissonance, that is, a sense of psychological discomfort that leads
them to try to reduce the conflict (Festinger 1957). Analogous to the idea of conflicting
cognitions, individuals may also experience psychological discomfort from holding internal
attitudes that are in conflict with the known appropriate social response. Borrowing the
terminology of cognitive dissonance theory, I offer the following hypothesis:
The Social Dissonance Hypothesis: When asked to first express an attitude pri-
vately, and then publicly in the face of a unanimously opposed majority, individu-
als will be more likely to alter their privately expressed attitude in order to publicly
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comply with the unanimous group attitude if the attitude that they expressed in
private runs counter to norms of social acceptability.
The Social Dissonance Hypothesis is not opposed to the General Social Conformity Hy-
pothesis 1 or General Social Conformity Hypothesis 2 ; rather, the Social Dissonance Hy-
pothesis simply predicts a more nuanced set of circumstances leading to conformity than
the latter two. Revisiting the hypothetical scenario put forth above in which an individual
is compelled to express an attitude privately and then publicly in the face of unanimous
opposition, imagine further that the particular attitude being expressed is on a sensitive
social issue, and that individuals have an accurate sense of the range of attitudes that are
deemed socially appropriate with respect to that issue. The Social Dissonance Hypothe-
sis predicts that if the individual expressed an attitude in private that falls outside of the
range of social acceptability, she will be under more pressure to conform to the unanimously
opposed majority than if she expressed an attitude that falls in line with what is deemed
socially appropriate. Assuming that individuals in the United States recognize attitudes
expressing inegalitarian viewpoints as generally socially unacceptable, those who express an
inegalitarian opinion in private are more likely than those who express an egalitarian opinion
in private to submit to interpersonal pressures to express the opposite in public, according
to the Social Dissonance Hypothesis.
Even if we do find that under either general or limited circumstances, individuals have some
systematic tendency to conform to the opposed opinion of a group of peers, public compliance
in and of itself does not indicate whether the change in responses is due to internalization
of a new attitude (e.g., through learning or updating) or preference falsification to avoid
appearing deviant from the group. On the one hand, Sherif (1936) and Verhulst and Levitan
(2009) demonstrated that even brief interactions can lead to continued influence weeks,
or even months, later. Also, cognitive dissonance theory would predict that the very act
of providing a particular response publicly would lead an individual to be more likely to
internalize that attitude (Festinger 1957). Based on these considerations I propose the
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following:
The Attitude Internalization Hypothesis: When asked to first express an attitude
privately, then publicly in the face of a unanimously opposed majority, and then
again privately, individuals who altered their responses between the first private
setting and the group setting will maintain the attitude expressed in the group
setting in the second private setting.
However, and as has been discussed, it is also plausible to think that expressions of atti-
tudes on sensitive social issues do not operate in exactly the same manner. For instance, in
a large body of work, Kuran (1987, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1995), has used formal logic, anecdotal
accounts, and qualitative analysis of political events to argue convincingly that individual
public compliance with a belief that is incongruent with internal attitudes is a theoretically
plausible phenomenon. At the individual level, one can think of agents earning a type of
expressive benefit by stating publicly their true preferences with respect to social referents
and incurring a type of expressive cost by stating publicly a view that goes against the
majority opinion (Kuran 1995). The primary mechanisms leading to these costs and ben-
efits are negative and positive reinforcement by other group members. Under very general
circumstances, it can be shown that norms of public compliance that run counter to some
or all of a group’s members’ internal attitudes can persist if the costs of going against the
group are sufficiently high. Based on this discussion, I offer the following:
The Preference Falsification Hypothesis: When asked to first express an attitude
privately, then publicly in the face of a unanimously opposed majority, and then
again privately, individuals who altered their responses between the first private
setting and the group setting will alter them again in the second private setting
in the direction of the original response.
Predictions about whether any attitude changes witnessed as a result of social pressure are
real attitude changes or artificial public compliance are expressed as competing hypotheses
because the previous literature offers competing expectations.
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3.3 The Social Pressure Experiments
I now present a set of experiments that were employed to test the hypotheses put forth in
the previous section. The studies took place from September 2011 through April 2012 and
used as subjects undergraduates from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The
design objective was to situate each study within the tradition of previous research on social
conformity from social psychology and related fields, but to push the envelope into territory
not yet explored by previous researchers—that is, public expression of political attitudes as
it relates to egalitarian norms (for the only known example of a similar design with respect
to political attitudes more generally, see Verhulst and Levitan 2009). In one instance using
a between-subjects design, and in another instance using a within-subjects design, either
a control group or a pre-treatment measurement of treated subjects was used to establish
a baseline measurement of the types of responses to potentially sensitive social issues that
subjects were willing to give in isolation. These were then used in fictitious group settings
to construct treatments intended to generate social pressure in the opposite direction of the
baseline measurements.
3.3.1 The Behavioral Task
To relate the experimental designs to the preceding discussion, a behavioral task had to
be chosen that would tap subjects’ levels of adherence to egalitarian norms. In the United
States, as in many other multicultural societies, it is without controversy to claim that in
most public social settings, norms of appropriate social behavior dictate compliance with a
norm of individual and group equality, without respect to race, ethnicity, religion, gender,
and so forth. That is, individuals’ true attitudes with respect to, say, religious equality,
are expected to vary—sometimes greatly—in reality, but the range of appropriate public
expression of religious attitudes lies wholly on the equality side of the scale. With respect
to specific identifiable groups, however, tolerance of dissent from the norm of equality can
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vary at any given time given contemporaneous social circumstances. Therefore, in order to
examine differences between subjects who are willing to express an inegalitarian attitude
and those who are not, a target group had to be chosen that would elicit a relatively high
level of variation in subject responses. Based on a variety of polling data, as well as a current
social climate in which the threat of violence by Islamist groups looms large in the Western
public conscience, expressed attitudes about Muslims and Islam by non-Muslims was chosen
as the behavioral task of interest for examining social pressure.1
Table 3.1 presents the questionnaire items that will be used as behavioral measures to
test the various hypotheses put forth above. For each question, a determination was made
as to what constituted the egalitarian and inegalitarian responses, and these decisions are
indicated in the latter columns of the table. The number of response options available to
subjects on the questionnaire is also indicated. Further, each question is given an identifi-
cation number (first column). In much of the discussion that follows, it will be useful and
efficient to refer to questionnaire items by their identification number rather than their full
question wording.
3.3.2 Participants
Subjects were recruited from undergraduate political science courses at the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in exchange for extra credit. Subjects were recruited under
the auspices of taking part in a study on “group and individual decision making.” Sum-
mary statistics for the participants included in the analyses presented here are presented in
Appendix B.
1The incentive for subjects to participate in the study was extra course credit for one of their political
science courses, and therefore, in the name of fairness, all students in a given course were offered the
opportunity to participate. That is, Muslim students were not excluded from the recruitment pool. However,
a survey question asked students for their religious affiliations. In all analyses that follow, self-identified
Muslims are excluded.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Questions About Muslims and Islam Used to Examine the Effect of
Social Pressure
ID Question Wording Response Egalitarian Inegalitarian
Scale Response Response
Q1
Would you be nervous if a Muslim
man were on the same flight as
you?
2-point No Yes
Q2
Would you mind living in a neigh-
borhood where half of your neigh-
bors are Muslim?
2-point No Yes
Q3
Do you favor special security
checks at airports for Muslims?
4-point
Str. oppose/
Oppose
Str. favor/
Favor
Q4
Would you worry a lot, a mod-
erate amount, a little, or not at
all about having a Muslim as a
neighbor?
4-point
A little/
Not at all
Mod. amount/
A lot
Q5
In your best estimation, what
proportion of Muslims in the
world are anti-American?
3-point
Some or
Just a few
Most or Almost
all/About half
Q6
Do people have the right to keep
Muslim organizations out of their
neighborhoods?
2-point No Yes
Q7
Would you mind if you yourself
or your children were to have a
Muslim teacher at school?
2-point No Yes
Q8
Do you think that most, many,
only some, or very few Muslims
living in the United States to-
day support the use of violence by
Muslims against non-Muslims?
4-point
Only Some/
Very Few
Most/
Many
Q9
How worried are you, if at all,
about radicals within the U.S.
Muslim community?
3-point
Not worried
at all
Very worried/
A little worried
Q10
Would you mind if your children
were to attend a predominantly
Muslim school?
2-point No Yes
Q11
In general, do you think that
Islam is more likely than other
religions to encourage violence
among its believers?
2-point No Yes
...
Table continued on next page.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Questions About Muslims and Islam Used to Examine the Effect of
Social Pressure (continued from previous page)
ID Question Wording Response Egalitarian Inegalitarian
Scale Response Response
Q12
Do you think that most, many,
only some, or very few Muslims
living in the United States today
are peaceable and do not condone
violence?
4-point
Most/
Many
Only Some/
Very Few
Q13
Would you mind having a Muslim
supervisor at work?
2-point No Yes
Q14
Would you be nervous if a Muslim
woman were on the same flight as
you?
2-point No Yes
Q15
Would you mind if a close relative
who is male married a Muslim?
2-point No Yes
Q16
Would you mind if a close relative
who is female married a Muslim?
2-point No Yes
Q17
Do you think that most, many,
only some, or very few Muslims
living in the United States today
support the goals of Al Qaeda and
the Islamic fundamentalists?
4-point
Only Some/
Very Few
Most/
Many
Q18
Do you favor laws that prohibit
discrimination against Muslims?
4-point
Str. favor/
Favor
Str. oppose/
Oppose
Q19
Based on the events of September
11th, 2001, would you favor or op-
pose the U.S. government tight-
ening immigration laws to restrict
the number of immigrants from
Arab or Muslim countries enter-
ing the United States?
4-point
Str. favor/
Favor
Str. oppose/
Oppose
Q20
Should someone who says that
terrorist attacks against America
are the fault of how America be-
haves in the world be allowed to
teach in a public school?
2-point No Yes
Note: ID numbers are used to refer to particular questions in the text. Combined response options in the egalitarian and
inegalitarian categories are separated by slashes.
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3.3.3 The Looming Social Pressure Experiment
In the first study, a control group of subjects came to the laboratory and answered a ques-
tionnaire that tapped, among other items, attitudes about Islam and Muslims. These control
measures were then used to construct a treatment intended to generate social pressure in the
opposite direction of that established in the baseline setting (this is similar to the method
used by Sherif 1935, 1936; see also Jacobs and Campbell 1961). This social pressure treat-
ment was administered via a contrived group setting in which subjects in the treatment
group were provided information about the distribution of opinion among a group of other
participants whom they would meet in a face-to-face setting at a later time.
Procedure for Control Group
Up to 20 subjects at a time gathered in a waiting room adjoined to a set of individual,
private, enclosed computer terminals. Subjects arrived individually, typically over a period
of 10 to 20 minutes. After filling out preliminary paperwork, subjects were told that they
would be participants in a broader research study on group and individual decision making,
and that today, they would simply take part in an individual survey. Subjects were then
assigned to a computer terminal, and followed a set of instructions as the software led them
through a questionnaire.
To simply gather a distribution of responses to the questionnaire, it was not strictly
necessary to have subjects gather together in a common waiting room or to go through the
computer-based survey in an enclosed, private computer terminal. But these steps were
taken to attempt to eliminate any confounding effects of the experimental context itself.
Given that the primary measures of interest in the study are subject responses to questions
tapping sensitive social issues, it seems reasonable to expect that certain features of the
laboratory setting may come to bear on the on the extent to which individuals feel confident
about the anonymity of their responses. Specifically, it is likely that the social nature of
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the way the subjects gather and the privacy of the physical setting in which they answer
the questionnaire could each impact the degree of general social desirability bias exhibited
in the survey responses. The goal of the control setting was not to eliminate biases in
responses stemming from social desirability effects, but rather to ensure that such biases can
be excluded as a competing explanation for any differences witnessed between the treatment
and control groups.
Procedure for Treatment Group
Overview After being given information about the supposed distribution of attitudes on
several public opinion items among a subset of other study participants, subjects answered
a computer-based questionnaire tapping those same attitudinal measures, among others. A
ruse was employed to convince subjects that their own responses to the questionnaire would
eventually be made public to that same group of other participants, following which time
they would engage in a face-to-face task with them. Because the manipulation relied on
a deception, following the questionnaire subjects were queried as to whether the deception
was convincing.
Preliminaries Up to 10 subjects at a time gathered in the same waiting room that was
used in the control condition. Again, subjects arrived individually, typically over a period of
10 to 20 minutes. As subjects filled out preliminary paperwork, the researcher informed them
that another group of subjects was taking part in a study in a nearby room, and that the
progress of that group would have to be monitored. This other group of participants did not
in fact exist, but to complete the ruse, the researcher periodically left the room to supposedly
check on them. Specifically, the researcher would apologize and leave the room for a period
of one to two minutes. Upon returning to the room, the researcher would go to a computer
in the waiting room and look through a spreadsheet full of seemingly random numbers in full
view of the participants. The purpose of each of these steps was to make the deception more
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convincing. This process was then repeated every several minutes until the agreed-upon
start time of the study had passed and each subject had experienced the researcher leaving
the room and returning at least once. At that point, the researcher addressed the entire
group of subjects, instructing them to file into their assigned computer terminals, close the
door, and await further individual instructions while the researcher confirmed the status of
the supposed other group’s progress. Specific instructions are provided in Appendix A.
Individual Instructions 1 As the subjects filed into their assigned computer terminals
and closed the door, the researcher left the room for a period of one to two minutes to
supposedly check on the other group of participants. Upon returning, the researcher walked
into each computer terminal and gave a set of supposedly individualized instructions. In fact,
however, the instructions recited to each subject were identical. Specifically, the researcher
walked into each computer terminal carrying a file folder containing four sheets of paper
with printed material on them. The researcher informed subjects that part of the purpose
of the study was to analyze group decision-making situations when people are allowed to
learn about their fellow group members prior to engaging in a face-to-face task. To that end,
the subjects were told that they were assigned to a group composed of four people from the
other room, and that the printed material in the file folder represented the responses of these
four people to six randomly chosen questions from a questionnaire that they had answered.
To eliminate possible suspicion about the deception at this point in the study, the researcher
informed subjects that the participants today were assigned two different roles, and that the
difference between the people who gathered with the subject and the people in the other
room was that the latter did not know about the group component prior to answering the
questionnaire, and that this difference would be used to test something. The researcher
instructed subjects on how to read the printouts of others’ responses, and asked them to
look them over for a few minutes and await further instructions. The printed materials given
to subjects are presented in Figure 3.1 and the specific instructions recited are presented in
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Appendix A. The researcher then left the private computer terminal, closed the door, and
in succession gave the same set of instructions to the remaining subjects.
Individual Instructions 2 After each subject went through the procedure described
above, the researcher returned and informed them that they would now go through the
same questionnaire answered by their fellow group members. They were also informed
that following the questionnaire, they would have a brief break before the group decision-
making task, at which time the researcher would make a similar printout about them and
present it to their fellow group members before the initial face-to-face meeting. The group
decision-making task, they were told, would be very brief, and then their participation in
the study would be over. Then at their individual computer terminals, subjects answered
the questionnaire, received a debriefing about the deception employed in the study, and then
answered questions about whether the deception was successful.
Results
Comparing the printed materials in Figure 3.1 to Table 3.1, we see that four of the six
questions of interest were used to generate the social pressure treatment. For the question
of whether subjects would be nervous if a Muslim man were on the same flight as them
(Q1), the supposed distribution of opinion among the four group members was unanimously
“Yes”; for the question of whether subjects would worry about having a Muslim as a neighbor
(Q4), the distribution was two answering “A lot” and two answering “A moderate amount”;
for the question of what proportion of Muslims in the world are anti-American(Q5), the
distribution was one answering “Most/Almost all” and three answering “About half”; and
for the question of whether people have the right to keep Muslim organizations out of their
neighborhoods (Q6), the distribution was the distribution was unanimously “Yes.” All of
the responses of future group members, therefore, fall on the inegalitarian side of the scale
(see Table 3.1). In the discussion that follows, these questions will be referred to as direct
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Figure 3.1: Example Printouts Given to Subjects During the Looming Social Pressure Ex-
periment
SURVEY RESULTS  SEPTEMBER 28, 2011   SESSION 2 PARTICIPANT # 3
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Do people have the right to keep
Muslim organizations out of their
neighborhoods?
Yes No
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Do you approve or disapprove of
the way that President Obama is
handling the situation in
Afghanistan?
Strongly
Approve Approve Disapprove
Strongly
Disapprove
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Do you favor or oppose the idea
that homosexuals should be allowed
to serve openly in the United
States military?
Strongly
Favor Favor Oppose
Strongly
Oppose
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Would you be nervous if a Muslim
man were on the same flight as
you?
Yes No
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Would you worry a lot, a moderate
amount, a little, or not at all
about having a Muslim as a
neighbor?
A lot
A moderate
amount A little Not at all
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In your best estimation, what
proportion of Muslims in the world
are anti-American?
Most/Almost
All About Half
Some/Just a
Few
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SURVEY RESULTS  SEPTEMBER 28, 2011   SESSION 2 PARTICIPANT # 4
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Do people have the right to keep
Muslim organizations out of their
neighborhoods?
Yes No
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Do you approve or disapprove of
the way that President Obama is
handling the situation in
Afghanistan?
Strongly
Approve Approve Disapprove
Strongly
Disapprove
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Do you favor or oppose the idea
that homosexuals should be allowed
to serve openly in the United
States military?
Strongly
Favor Favor Oppose
Strongly
Oppose
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Would you be nervous if a Muslim
man were on the same flight as
you?
Yes No
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Would you worry a lot, a moderate
amount, a little, or not at all
about having a Muslim as a
neighbor?
A lot
A moderate
amount A little Not at all
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In your best estimation, what
proportion of Muslims in the world
are anti-American?
Most/Almost
All About Half
Some/Just a
Few
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
...
Figure continued on next page.
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Figure 3.1: Example Printouts Given to Subjects During the Looming Social Pressure Ex-
periment (continued from previous page)
SURVEY RESULTS  SEPTEMBER 28, 2011   SESSION 2 PARTICIPANT # 6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Do people have the right to keep
Muslim organizations out of their
neighborhoods?
Yes No
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Do you approve or disapprove of
the way that President Obama is
handling the situation in
Afghanistan?
Strongly
Approve Approve Disapprove
Strongly
Disapprove
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Do you favor or oppose the idea
that homosexuals should be allowed
to serve openly in the United
States military?
Strongly
Favor Favor Oppose
Strongly
Oppose
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Would you be nervous if a Muslim
man were on the same flight as
you?
Yes No
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Would you worry a lot, a moderate
amount, a little, or not at all
about having a Muslim as a
neighbor?
A lot
A moderate
amount A little Not at all
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In your best estimation, what
proportion of Muslims in the world
are anti-American?
Most/Almost
All About Half
Some/Just a
Few
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SURVEY RESULTS  SEPTEMBER 28, 2011   SESSION 2 PARTICIPANT # 9
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Do people have the right to keep
Muslim organizations out of their
neighborhoods?
Yes No
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Do you approve or disapprove of
the way that President Obama is
handling the situation in
Afghanistan?
Strongly
Approve Approve Disapprove
Strongly
Disapprove
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Do you favor or oppose the idea
that homosexuals should be allowed
to serve openly in the United
States military?
Strongly
Favor Favor Oppose
Strongly
Oppose
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Would you be nervous if a Muslim
man were on the same flight as
you?
Yes No
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Would you worry a lot, a moderate
amount, a little, or not at all
about having a Muslim as a
neighbor?
A lot
A moderate
amount A little Not at all
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In your best estimation, what
proportion of Muslims in the world
are anti-American?
Most/Almost
All About Half
Some/Just a
Few
X
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Each panel is one page of a printout given to experimental subjects that supposedly represented the distribution of
opinion among fellow group members across six randomly chosen questions. Materials given to subjects were identical across
and within study days, with the exception that the date on the top of each page of the printout always reflected the current
date. Materials were contained in a file folder with “# 11” written on the outside (see instructions in Appendix A for details).
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questions, given that they are the questions for which direct social pressure was exerted.
The remaining questions (Q2-Q3 and Q7-Q18) will be referred to as indirect questions.
To get an initial sense of the distribution of responses in the treatment and control groups,
Figure 3.2 presents barplots of the questions drawn directly from the materials given to sub-
jects. For each question with more than two response options, the egalitarian and inegali-
tarian response categories are each collapsed. The first point to note is that the deliberate
construction of a treatment to exert social pressure in the opposite direction of the distri-
bution of opinion established in a control setting necessarily dictated that the treatment
distribution would be skewed toward inegalitarianism. Comparing the heights of the dark
bars within each panel, it is clear that subjects in isolation show an overwhelming tendency
to choose the egalitarian response option on these particular questions. Given the large
body of research on Americans’ racial attitudes, this result is not at all surprising. For
question Q4, the difference between the set of control subjects who gave the egalitarian and
inegalitarian responses was about 93 percentage points.
The second thing to notice is that the percentage point difference between the subset of
subjects giving the egalitarian and inegalitarian responses was dissipated across the board
in the treatment group. For each question, when informed that the attitudes of their fellow
group members were unanimously on the inegalitarian side of the response scale, and under
the expectation that their own responses would be made public to a group of peers, the
percentage of subjects willing to give the inegalitarian response increased by about 18 per-
centage points for Q1, by about 1 percentage point for Q4, by about 13 percentage points
for Q5, and by about 0.04 percentage points for Q6. The directional effects clearly exhibit
initial support for General Social Conformity Hypothesis 1, but we cannot be confident yet
that these differences are significant.
Focusing just on these direct questions, Table 3.2 presents χ2 difference of proportion tests
for the proportion of subjects giving the inegalitarian response between the treatment and
control groups. Also presented are Fisher’s exact tests of independence for the contingency
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Egalitarian and Inegalitarian Responses in the Looming Social
Pressure Experiment for Questions Drawn Directly From Materials
Q1: Would you be nervous if a Muslim
man were on the same flight as you?
Q4: Would you worry a lot, a moderate
amount, a little, or not at all about having
a Muslim as a neighbor?
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Q5: In your best estimation, what pro-
portion of Muslims in the world are anti-
American?
Q6: Do people have the right to keep
Muslim organizations out of their neigh-
borhoods?
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Note: For response choices identified as egalitarian and inegalitarian, refer to Table 3.1. Combined response options in the
egalitarian and inegalitarian categories are separated by slashes. Bar heights are percentages within categories. Numbers above
bars are the actual number of respondents in each category.
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Table 3.2: Treatment-Control Differences in the Looming Social Pressure Experiment for
Questions Drawn Directly From Materials
Control Treatment Fisher’s
Inegalitarian Inegalitarian Asymptotic Exact
ID Proportion Proportion χ2(1) p-value p-value
Q1 0.182 0.358 5.893 0.008 0.009
Q4 0.034 0.113 3.347 0.034 0.039
Q5 0.324 0.453 2.272 0.066 0.067
Q6 0.151 0.189 0.182 0.335 0.328
Note: Second and third columns are the proportions of respondents in the control and treatment conditions, respectively, that
gave the response identified as inegalitarian (see Table 3.1). Null hypothesis for Fisher’s exact test is that the number of people
who gave the inegalitarian response is unrelated to whether they were in the treatment or control group. Alternative hypothesis
is that the number of people in the treatment group who gave the inegalitarian response is greater than the number in the
control group. Asymptotic p-value is based on the χ2(1) approximation of the hypergeometric null distribution (Fisher 1922)
using Yates’ continuity correction (Yates 1934).
table in which subjects are classified according to whether they were in the treatment or
control group and whether they gave the inegalitarian response. For both tests, the null
hypothesis of no relationship was put in contrast to the alternative that the proportion or
number in the treatment group was greater than the the proportion or number in the control
group. The χ2 p-values and the exact p-values match quite closely, and they tell a story that
comports with the illustration in in Figure 3.2.
The two questions that seem to elicit the largest social pressure effect tap a general sense
of concern among the subjects about being in close proximity to Muslims. Upon reflection,
this sense of concern forms a qualitative similarity between Q1 and Q4 that also provides a
qualitative difference with the other questions. When asked about the level of nervousness or
worry about being on a flight with a Muslim or having a Muslim as a neighbor, subjects are
more susceptible to the power of suggestion from their peers than with respect to other types
of questions. For both of these questions, the difference in proportion of subjects giving the
inegalitarian response between the treatment and control groups achieves a conventional level
of statistical significance, and the 17 percentage point difference is particularly pronounced
in the case of Q1. At least one plausible interpretation of these results is that a large
proportion of non-Muslims carry some positive level of concern about being in close proximity
to Muslims, but they typically allow that concern to remain latent if asked. Upon learning
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that a group of non-Muslims peers are willing to express openly their concern in these
situations, those individuals receive a cue that it is permitted, if not necessary, to allow
those concerns to come out of latency to the forefront. Notice that this interpretation is not
stating that individuals are being compelled to express an attitude that they do not believe.
Rather, it is simply stating that in the absence of a defined group opinion, the overwhelming
tendency is for individuals to keep those concerns on the backburner. And it is reasonable to
believe that at least one reason for this is the perception of an appropriate social response.
Q5, tapping subjects’ perceptions of the pervasiveness of Muslim anti-Americanism, is
qualitatively different from Q1 and Q4, but the result is similar. The difference in proportion
giving the inegalitarian response between treatment and control groups achieves marginal
statistical significance in this case. And because this question is closer to a statement of
factual knowledge than questions tapping personal concern, it is difficult to provide the same
interpretation. To the extent that individuals encounter this question having not considered
it before, it is perhaps the case that the unanimously inegalitarian responses of fellow group
members provide information about the correct answer to this question. To the extent that
individuals do have well formed attitudes with respect to this question, movement away
from these attitudes must necessarily represent public compliance with views that they do
not truly hold. But because it is likely that on-the-fly opinion formation and alteration of
true attitudes are both occurring, teasing out the degree of simple learning and the degree
of preference falsification is simply not possible with the data at hand. What we can say
is that there is strong evidence of a public compliance effect, regardless of the underlying
mechanism producing it.
For Q6, the differences in proportions giving the inegalitarian response between the treat-
ment and control groups does not come close to achieving a conventional level of statistical
significance. Here the reason behind the result could plausibly reside in the fact that this
particular question may be tapping less of a personal attitude about Muslims and more of a
personal attitude about the civil rights of minority groups in general. Regardless of individ-
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Table 3.3: Treatment-Control Differences in the Looming Social Pressure Experiment for
Questions Not Drawn Directly From Materials
Control Treatment Fisher’s
Inegalitarian Inegalitarian Asymptotic Exact
ID Proportion Proportion χ2(1) p-value p-value
Q2 0.426 0.453 0.033 0.428 0.427
Q3 0.223 0.264 0.175 0.338 0.333
Q7 0.082 0.113 0.167 0.341 0.584
Q8 0.061 0.152 2.758 0.048 0.054
Q9 0.709 0.830 2.370 0.062 0.059
Q10 0.581 0.623 0.134 0.357 0.359
Q11 0.333 0.434 1.303 0.127 0.127
Q12 0.054 0.019 0.468 0.247 0.259
Q13 0.095 0.057 0.320 0.714 0.876
Q14 0.047 0.075 0.178 0.337 0.322
Q15 0.182 0.154 0.065 0.600 0.747
Q16 0.320 0.358 0.118 0.365 0.362
Q17 0.047 0.038 0.000 0.500 0.607
Q18 0.524 0.415 1.433 0.884 0.546
Note: Second and third columns are the proportions of respondents in the control and treatment conditions, respectively,
that gave the response identified as inegalitarian (see Table 3.1). Null hypothesis is that the number of people who give the
inegalitarian response is unrelated to whether they were in the treatment or control group. Alternative hypothesis is that the
number of people in the treatment group who give the inegalitarian response is greater than the number in the control group.
Asymptotic p-value is based on the χ2(1) approximation of the hypergeometric null distribution (Fisher 1922) using Yates’
continuity correction (Yates 1934).
uals’ personal views of Muslims and Islam, the overwhelming majority is likely to recognize
the rights of all groups to operate within the bounds of the law. In hindsight, the lack of
a social pressure effect with respect to this question is not surprising, and in fact perhaps
should have been expected.
As a point of comparison to the questions for which direct social pressure was exerted
in the treatment, Table 3.3 presents χ2 difference of proportion tests and Fisher’s exact
tests for the indirect questions, that is, the remaining questions on the survey tapping
attitudes about Islam and Muslims for which no information about the distribution of peer
responses was given. And the big takeaway point from this table is that very little in the
way of differences between treatment and control groups is exhibited. Differences between
treatment and control achieve marginal statistical significance for Q8 and Q9, which tap
58
subjects’ attitudes about militant Islam within the United States. Another question, Q11,
also measures attitudes about radical Islam, and the differences between treatment and
control in this case are approaching marginal significance. It is plausible to think that
individuals who encounter a unanimous opinion from their peers on an issue to which they
have not given much thought might use that information to make inferences about the
distribution of opinion on related questions. Then public compliance to a perceived group
attitude may operate on inferred group attitudes just as well as realized group attitudes. But
if this is the case, then it is not clear why other questions tapping opinions about militant
Islam in the U.S. (e.g., Q12 and Q17) do not show a similar effect. In fact, for no questions
other than Q8, Q9, and Q11 do differences between treatment and control even come close
to being statistically significant. The fact that each of these questions seems qualitatively to
measure a similar subcategory of attitudes about Islam and Muslims is promising evidence
for the case that something systematic may be left uncovered. But the overall picture is
that a form of indirect social pressure, in which subjects use available information to make
inferences about social pressure in other areas, is not occurring in general.
The analyses thus far have not accounted for individual-level characteristics beyond as-
signment to treatment or control groups. To control for characteristics of the individual, a
series of logistic regressions were used to model the individual-level probability of providing
an inegalitarian response. For each model in Table 3.4, the unit of analysis is the individual
subject, and the binary dependent variable is 1 if the subject gave the inegalitarian response
to the question identified in each column heading, and 0 otherwise. Dummy variables are
used to capture race (1 = white), gender (1 = female), religion (1 = Christian), and par-
tisan identification (1 = Republican), and a count variable is used to capture education (1
= first year through 4 = fourth year or greater). Interestingly, at this level of analysis,
when controlling for race, gender, religion, partisan identification, and education, only Q1,
the question tapping nervousness about being on a flight with a Muslim man, exhibits a
treatment effect that achieves a conventional level of statistical significance. However, the
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Table 3.4: Logistic Regression Models of Inegalitarian Responses on Questions Used for
Direct Social Pressure
Question 1 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e)
Treatment 0.982* 1.063 0.585 0.388
(0.385) (0.660) (0.362) (0.456)
White 0.353 -0.405 -0.339 0.448
(0.465) (0.753) (0.397) (0.597)
Female 0.162 0.325 0.159 0.441
(0.375) (0.650) (0.340) (0.425)
Christian -0.111 0.686 0.550 0.519
(0.424) (0.850) (0.389) (0.553)
Republican 0.725† 0.298 1.309*** 1.227**
(0.421) (0.766) (0.389) (0.446)
Education -0.225 -0.570 -0.422* -0.003
(0.198) (0.466) (0.182) (0.213)
Constant -1.624** -2.767* -0.570 -3.080***
(0.611) (1.169) (0.526) (0.794)
N 197 197 197 196
Log-likelihood -98.187 -38.739 -115.031 -79.645
Note: Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. Binary dependent variable is 1 if the
respondent gave the inegalitarian response, and 0 otherwise.
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; †p < 0.10
estimated treatment effects for Q4 and Q5 come very close to a 90% confidence level (for
Q4, p ≈ 0.107, and for Q5, p ≈ 0.108). As expected from the tests of independence and
differences of proportions between treatment and control groups, the treatment effect for Q6
does not come close to achieving statistical significance. Among the subject covariate profiles
the only substantial predictor of the likelihood of giving an inegalitarian response to these
questions is partisan identification. Specifically, self-identified Republicans are significantly
more likely to express nervousness about being on a flight with a Muslim man, to estimate
that most or about half of Muslims in the world are anti-American, and to state that people
have the right to keep Muslim organizations out of their neighborhoods. Additionally, a
greater number of years in school is associated with a lower likelihood of estimating that
most or about half of Muslims in the world are anti-American.
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Figure 3.3: Predicted Probabilities from Logistic Regression of Inegalitarian Responses on
Questions Used for Direct Social Pressure
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Note: Predicted probabilities are for treatment and control groups for each model in Table 3.4. Calculations are for a baseline
subject is a white, female, Christian, Republican, college freshman. Actual probabilities are presented above the bars.
If we can momentarily put aside the lack of statistical significance for Q6, further interpre-
tation is available through the calculation of predicted probabilities. Figure 3.3 provides a
graphical representation of the predicted probability of giving the inegalitarian response for
members of the treatment and control groups based on the estimates in Table 3.4. For each
of these calculations, all other independent variables are held constant at 1, and therefore the
baseline hypothetical subject under consideration is a white, female, Christian, Republican,
college freshman. As expected, the most dramatic treatment-control probability difference
is for Q1. A baseline subject in the control group has a probability of only 0.327 of openly
expressing nervousness about being on the same flight as a Muslim man, while for a baseline
subject in the treatment group this probability increases to 0.565 (an increase of roughly
0.24, from below the 0.5 threshold to above it). For Q4 and Q5, this increase is roughly 0.12,
about half that of Q1. Interestingly, for Q5, tapping the estimation of anti-Americanism
among Muslims, the baseline subject already exhibits a relatively high likelihood of providing
the inegalitarian response (due largely to the strong impact of Republican party identifica-
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Table 3.5: Logistic Regression Models of Inegalitarian Responses, Pooling Across Direct and
Indirect Social Pressure Categories
Indirect Questions Direct Questions
Estimate (s.e.) Estimate (s.e.)
Treatment 0.242 (0.166) 0.724** (0.275)
White -0.123 (0.176) 0.055 (0.318)
Female -0.083 (0.156) 0.243 (0.262)
Christian 0.366* (0.170) 0.322 (0.307)
Republican 0.653*** (0.174) 1.071*** (0.289)
Education -0.106 (0.077) -0.280* (0.139)
Constant -1.303*** (0.237) -2.060*** (0.430)
Observations 2745 787
Subjects 197 197
Var(αi) 0.582 0.582
Log-likelihood -1522.737 -362.458
Note: Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Binary dependent variable is 1 if the
respondent gave the inegalitarian response, and 0 otherwise. All models include subject-level random intercepts, αi, where i
indexes subjects. The unit of observation is the subject-question.
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; †p < 0.10
tion, but the treatment has the impact of increasing this likelihood even further. For Q4,
both treatment and control subjects exhibit a relatively low likelihood of openly providing
the inegalitarian response.
It may also be the case, however, that focusing on subject-level analyses for individual
questions is somehow masking a more general process that might be revealed by pooling
across responses to questions. To begin to examine the impact of combining responses across
questions, Table 3.5 presents a set of logistic regressions where, again, the binary dependent
variable is 1 if the subject changed her response, and 0 otherwise. But in this case, the unit
of analysis is the subject response to a particular question (i.e., the subject-question), so
that each row of the data matrix is a unique subject-question combination. To account for
the hierarchical nature of the data, subject-level intercepts are assumed to be drawn from
a normal distribution and are allowed to vary randomly. The first model pools only across
indirect questions and the second pools only across direct questions.
Because the directional relationships in the raw data for each question of interest here all
point in the direction of support for General Social Conformity Hypothesis 1, it is plausible
62
to think that through borrowing strength across indirect questions and direct questions, the
estimated relationship for the indirect questions may become more substantial, and that
those for the direct questions may become less substantial (due to the lack of significance for
the treatment control differences with respect to Q6). But neither of these are the case, and
the relationships borne out by pooling are consistent with the previous discussions. First
and foremost, the treatment effect in the case of the direct questions is to substantially
increase the probability of expressing the inegalitarian response, while in the case of indirect
questions the treatment has no estimated effect. In the case of the indirect questions, the only
significant predictors of providing the inegalitarian response are subject self identification
as Christian and Republican. Both the condition of being a Christian and the condition
of being a Republican are expected to increase the likelihood of providing an inegalitarian
response to an indirect question. Moving to the case of direct questions, the impact of
partisan identification as Republican operates in the same direction and becomes even more
substantively meaningful. The impact of being a Christian, however, dissipates, while the
number of years in school becomes significantly associated with a decrease in the likelihood
of giving inegalitarian responses.
Once again, we can calculate predicted probabilities to help with interpretation of the
findings. Figure 3.4 provides a graphical representation of the fixed effects estimates from
the model in Table 3.5,2 and the form of the characteristic subject is again assumed by
setting the values of all covariates to 1. We find that the estimated increase in the prob-
ability of providing an inegalitarian response when moving from control to treatment is
substantial (about 0.18). The condition of being treated with information about an inegali-
tarian response distribution among peers has the effect of moving the likelihood of providing
inegalitarian response from below to above the 0.5 threshold.
Combining the data into unique subject-question observations is not the only means of
2Estimates for αi are set aside for the time being. Addition of the subject-level random intercepts can
be considered as deviations away from the global constant presented in Table 3.5.
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Figure 3.4: Predicted Probabilities from Logistic Regression of Inegalitarian, Pooling Across
Direct and Indirect Social Pressure Categories
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Note: Predicted probabilities are for treatment and control groups for each model in Table 3.5. Calculations are for a baseline
subject is a white, female, Christian, Republican, college freshman. Actual probabilities are presented above the bars.
pooling information across questions, however. Using the subject as the unit of analysis,
we may also consider counts and proportions of inegalitarian responses given during the
course of the study. To that end, Table 3.6 presents a series of negative binomial regressions
of the number of inegalitarian responses given by subjects,3 alongside a series of ordinary
least squares regressions of the proportion of responses that are inegalitarian. Data are pre-
sented for all questions of interest considered together, and for direct and indirect questions
considered separately.
In terms of estimated directional effects and statistical significance, the negative binomial
and OLS specifications mirror one another, and the results tell a familiar story given the
3The negative binomial distribution was chosen as an appropriate conditional model by first modeling
the counts of inegalitarian responses using a Poisson regression. A likelihood ratio test indicated that the
addition of the estimated variance parameter of the negative binomial specification provided a significantly
better fit to the data for the model using all questions and the model using only the indirect questions. This
result provides strong evidence for overdispersion, indicating that the Poisson specification is inappropriate.
In any case, the negative binomial model cannot be considered strictly appropriate for these data, as counts
following a negative binomial process theoretically do not have an upper bound, whereas the counts presented
here are bounded by the number of survey questions that respondents were asked. Nonetheless, the negative
binomial model can still provide a useful approximation.
64
T
ab
le
3.
6:
N
eg
at
iv
e
B
in
om
ia
l
an
d
O
rd
in
ar
y
L
ea
st
S
q
u
ar
es
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
of
C
ou
n
ts
an
d
P
ro
p
or
ti
on
s
of
In
eg
al
it
ar
ia
n
R
es
p
on
se
s
A
ll
Q
u
es
ti
on
s
In
d
ir
ec
t
Q
u
es
ti
on
s
D
ir
ec
t
Q
u
es
ti
on
s
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
N
eg
at
iv
e
B
in
om
ia
l
O
L
S
B
in
om
ia
l
O
L
S
B
in
om
ia
l
O
L
S
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
E
st
im
at
e
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
(s
.e
.)
T
re
at
m
en
t
0.
30
1*
0.
08
1*
0.
20
8†
0.
06
0†
0.
51
4*
*
0.
10
8*
*
(0
.1
26
)
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.1
21
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.1
81
)
(0
.0
40
)
W
h
it
e
-0
.0
42
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
73
-0
.0
19
0.
07
0
0.
00
9
(0
.1
35
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.1
29
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.2
25
)
(0
.0
41
)
F
em
al
e
-0
.0
93
-0
.0
21
-0
.0
92
-0
.0
23
0.
14
8
0.
02
5
(0
.1
16
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.1
10
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.1
77
)
(0
.0
37
)
C
h
ri
st
ia
n
0.
27
0*
0.
06
4*
0.
25
2*
0.
06
3*
0.
30
1
0.
04
4
(0
.1
25
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.1
21
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.2
21
)
(0
.0
39
)
R
ep
u
b
li
ca
n
0.
49
8*
**
0.
13
8*
**
0.
44
3*
**
0.
13
0*
**
0.
68
7*
**
0.
15
3*
**
(0
.1
25
)
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.1
19
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.1
89
)
(0
.0
42
)
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
-0
.0
97
-0
.0
20
-0
.0
95
†
-0
.0
21
-0
.1
77
†
-0
.0
32
†
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
56
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
96
)
(0
.0
18
)
C
on
st
an
t
1.
33
0*
**
0.
20
9*
**
1.
22
6*
**
0.
24
2*
**
-0
.6
50
*
0.
14
3*
(0
.1
80
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.1
71
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.3
07
)
(0
.0
56
)
θ
3.
69
0
5.
26
8
10
.3
08
(0
.7
47
)
(1
.3
99
)
(1
4.
42
9)
N
18
4
18
4
18
4
18
5
19
6
19
6
L
og
-L
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
-4
47
.5
36
-4
15
.1
53
-2
21
.8
84
R
2
0.
16
8
0.
14
4
0.
14
8
N
o
te
:
C
el
l
en
tr
ie
s
in
th
e
n
eg
a
ti
v
e
b
in
o
m
ia
l
co
lu
m
n
s
a
re
n
eg
a
ti
v
e
b
in
o
m
ia
l
re
g
re
ss
io
n
co
effi
ci
en
ts
,
w
h
er
e
th
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
eg
a
li
ta
ri
a
n
re
sp
o
n
se
s
g
iv
en
.
θ
is
th
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
co
n
d
it
io
n
a
l
v
a
ri
a
n
ce
o
f
th
e
re
sp
o
n
se
v
a
ri
a
b
le
.
C
el
l
en
tr
ie
s
in
th
e
O
L
S
co
lu
m
n
s
a
re
o
rd
in
a
ry
le
a
st
sq
u
a
re
s
co
effi
ci
en
ts
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
T
h
e
u
n
it
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
is
th
e
su
b
je
ct
.
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
0
1
;
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
;
*
p
<
0
.0
5
;
† p
<
0
.1
0
65
previously discussed findings. Across the board, self-identified Republicans are associated
with a greater number or proportion of inegalitarian responses than non-Republicans. The
number of years in school is generally marginally or close to marginally significantly related
to a lower number or proportion of inegalitarian responses. And for the analyses in which all
questions are pooled and indirect questions are pooled, self-identified Christians are associ-
ated with higher numbers or proportions of inegalitarian responses than non-Christians. But
for our purposes here, the most noteworthy finding is that those in the treatment group are
associated with higher numbers and greater proportions of inegalitarian responses no matter
how the data are broken down. Holding all other factors constant, the treatment effect is
smallest in the case of indirect questions only, and largest in the case of direct questions.
The OLS models tell us that for indirect questions, a movement from control to treatment
is expected to increase the proportion of inegalitarian responses by about 0.06, holding all
other factors constant. For direct questions, a move from control to treatment is expected
to increase the proportion of inegalitarian responses by about 0.108.
For the negative binomial specifications, a similar story emerges, but here it will once again
prove useful to calculate predicted probabilities. Figure 3.5 presents predicted probabilities
for each of the negative binomial specifications in Table 3.6, and for which the hypothetical
subject under consideration is again assumed by setting all of the covariates equal to one.
For each of the ways of subsetting the data, members of the control group have a higher
probability of espousing a low number of inegalitarian responses. For instance, out of the four
direct questions, the members of the control group have a higher probability of expressing
no or only one inegalitarian response. The members of the treatment group, however, have
a higher probability of expressing two, three, or four inegalitarian responses. In the model
for indirect questions only, out of the fourteen possible responses, members of the control
group have a higher probability of expressing zero through five inegalitarian responses, while
members of the treatment group have a higher probability of giving seven through 14. In
the model that uses all questions combined, out of 18 possible responses, the probability of
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Figure 3.5: Predicted Probabilities from Negative Binomial Regressions of Counts of Inegal-
itarian Responses
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expressing zero through seven inegalitarian responses is higher for members of the control
group than in the treatment group, whereas the probability of expressing eight through 18
inegalitarian responses is higher for members of the treatment group. In addition to there
being a generally higher probability of expressing a relatively large number of inegalitarian
responses in the treatment group, for each model it is also true that the peak probability
occurs at a lower number of inegalitarian responses in the control group than in the treatment
group.
Discussion
The results of the Looming Social Pressure study have been examined in a variety of ways,
all of which point to at least weak support for General Social Conformity Hypothesis 1. As
we know from a plethora of previous public opinion research, when Americans are asked
to express their attitudes on possibly sensitive social issues, the attitude distribution is
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typically skewed toward whatever happens to be the so-called politically correct response.
In the case of questions tapping a sense of equality between racial, ethnic, religious, gender,
or other groups, the politically correct response in modern times is certainly in favor of
egalitarianism under most circumstances. This result is exactly what was seen with respect
to the control group. However, when individuals are able to learn about the distribution
of opinions in a peer group that they will later have to meet for an unspecified face-to-face
decision-making task, and when that distribution is skewed in favor of inegalitarianism, the
results presented here suggest that they can be pulled away from that general egalitarian
position. These data do not allow us to say whether individuals in the treatment group are
actually generally in favor of a more egalitarian position and some significant number are
falsifying their preferences to publicly comply with the group opinion; or whether members
of the control group are actually generally in favor of a more inegalitarian position, and some
significant number are altering their responses because of typical social desirability effects;
or whether a significant proportion of subjects simply do not have a well formed attitude
with respect to many of the questions in the survey, and they are looking to whatever
information is available to them to form an opinion on the fly. Without knowing the source
of the tendency toward public compliance, however, the results are clear that a significant
amount of public compliance is in fact occurring.
The next study attempts to tease out more of the issues with respect to whether and what
kind of individuals are publicly complying by expressing an attitude that they would not
otherwise express. I turn to that study now.
3.3.4 The Real-Time Social Pressure Experiment
To test the hypotheses put forth regarding the propensity of individuals to alter their ex-
pressed attitudes in the face of social pressure requires comparisons of the behavior of in-
dividuals with respect to the same task, but under different social circumstances. That is,
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testing requires a within-subjects design that records measurements on subjects at multiple
time points. To develop such a design, it is useful to again revisit the general framework put
forth by Asch and Sherif, but make some important alterations and extensions.
Scholars in a variety of fields have argued over how to interpret the results from the Asch
and Sherif research programs, with some asserting that subjects are publicly complying with
the group while privately maintaining a different viewpoint (e.g., Kiesler and Kiesler 1969),
and others contending that subjects are unsure about the correct answer and are using the
views of fellow group members to learn the appropriate response (e.g., Thelen, Dollinger,
and Kirkland 1979). Boyd and Richerson (1985), on the other hand, argue convincingly that
one should leverage the difference in the level of ambiguity between the two decision-making
tasks and that doing so may lead to different conclusions about the phenomenon exhibited by
subjects. Specifically, since the judgment situation under study in the Asch experiments has
an answer that is clearly correct, while the judgment situation from the Sherif experiments
does not, it is plausible to conjecture that the subjects who conform to the view of the
confederates in the Asch experiments are exhibiting mere public compliance, while subjects
who conform in the Sherif experiments are exhibiting a form of social learning. But this has
not yet been tested in the extant literature. In the Real-Time Social Pressure Experiment,
I provide a design that allows one to explicitly differentiate between these explanations
empirically.
In the present study, I employ a design that takes a baseline attitude measurement of
subjects in a private, isolated condition. I then use the responses given in private to simulate
social pressure in a public group setting to determine if there is in fact a propensity for
individuals to succumb to social pressure. Following that, I measure subjects once more to
obtain some evidence on whether the response offered in the public setting was internalized.
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Procedure
Overview At a computer terminal, subjects provided responses to survey questions first in
isolation, then in a simulated group composed of other participants simultaneously taking
part in the study, then again in isolation. To simulate the experience of participating in a
computer-networked group interaction, subject photographs (headshots) were used in con-
junction with original software4 to mimic certain aspects of social networking websites, with
which a large proportion of subjects are expected to be familiar. Because the experiment
relied on a deception, following their participation subjects were questioned as to whether
the deception was convincing.
Preliminaries Up to 10 subjects at a time gathered in the same waiting room adjoined to
the set of individual, private, enclosed computer terminals described in the Looming Social
Pressure Experiment. After filling out preliminary paperwork, subjects were escorted one at
a time into a terminal in which the computer was equipped with a webcam. At this terminal,
subjects used a computer interface to enter identifying information and upload a headshot
of themselves to a server. Depending on the number of subjects attending a given session,
the preliminary picture upload portion of the study took approximately 5 to 15 minutes
to complete, during which time the subjects not uploading a photo at any given moment
were allowed to converse with one another. After the final photo was taken, all subjects
were simultaneously read a set of instructions outlining the structure of the experiment,
specifically noting that they would first answer a set of survey questions as individuals, then
be assigned to a group of other participants and perform some tasks in groups, and then
perform more tasks as individuals. Specific instructions are provided in Appendix A.
4Software to implement the design was written by the author in consultation with a professional developer.
Given the dynamic requirements of the experimental design, and to ensure cross-platform compatibility for
future development, the use of web forms was chosen as the most straightforward implementation method.
Page content, layout, actual dynamics, simulated dynamics, and database queries were handled using HTML,
CSS, PHP, JavaScript, and MySQL, respectively. More detailed information about software development is
available from the author upon request.
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Individual Pre Period Following the instructions, subjects took seats at enclosed com-
puter terminals where they encountered a set of instructions on how to begin the individual
questionnaire. After first selecting and confirming the identifying information provided dur-
ing the picture upload process, subjects answered a series of survey questions in typical
computer-interface fashion. As before, the primary items of interest for the purposes of
hypothesis testing are questions that tap non-Muslim subjects’ attitudes with respect to
Muslims and Islam. To assist in masking the intended purpose of the study, in between
questions of primary interest subjects were asked questionnaire items that tapped other po-
litical attitudes, as well as demographic and personality characteristics. All questionnaire
items measure concepts worthy of study in their own right in a typical mass survey, but
the primary purpose of the non-Muslim, non-Islam questions in this study was to serve as
distraction between repeated tapping of the primary concept of interest.
Group Period Following the initial individual-level survey items, subjects reached a wait-
ing screen where they were told that their group was being formed for the group period.
After a brief delay, each subject was taken to a screen where their own picture was shown
alongside two other participants taking part in the study at the same time. Subjects were
told that this collection of participants would comprise their group. Additionally, at this
time subjects were instructed that the group period of the study would consist of answering
questions similar to those asked in the Individual Pre Period, the difference being that all
group members would be able to witness all other group members’ responses. Addition-
ally, subjects were told that the order in which group members would answer each question
would be randomly chosen. As subjects navigated through the questions during the group
round, the order in which group members would answer each question was made known to
the subjects by displaying group members’ pictures in order from left to right, with group
members’ responses displayed below their pictures.
In reality, the groups were fictitious constructions. Pictures of other participants taking
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part in the experiment and pre-programmed dynamic responses actually played the role
of confederates. That is, for any given subject, group members’ supposed responses were
either predetermined or a function of the subject’s previous responses in Individual Pre Pe-
riod. Specifically, intermixed within a set of distraction items that subjects answered in
the first or second position in the group, and for which they faced a mixture of agreement
and disagreement from their fellow group members, subjects encountered a series of ques-
tions about Muslims and Islam that they had previously been asked in the initial round
of questioning. For these items (the questions of primary interest), subjects were asked to
answer last (or, in one case, in the middle position) in the face of a group whose responses
were unanimously in diametric opposition to the response given by the subject in the initial
round of questioning. For example, suppose that in the Individual Pre Period a subject
responded to a question by choosing the egalitarian (inegalitarian) response. Then, in the
group round, they would be asked to respond in the face of a unanimous majority choosing
the inegalitarian (egalitarian) response. In this way, the responses that subjects supply in
isolation provide a baseline measure of attitudes from which to gauge their propensities to
deviate from that baseline when confronted with an opposed majority group attitude. This
feature of the design parallels the basic approach employed by Asch (1951, 1952, 1956) and
Sherif (1935, 1936) with respect to arbitrary decision-making tasks, but applies it to the
measure of political attitudes that should be expected to carry some social significance for
the subjects outside of the laboratory.
Following a series of questions about Islam and Muslims in which subjects were compelled
to answer after other group members while facing a unanimously opposed majority, subjects
then encountered a set of similar questions in which they were compelled to answer in the
first group position. Similar to the design executed by Jacobs and Campbell (1961), the re-
peated instances of answering in the last group position allows the subject the opportunity
to learn about the supposed distribution of opinion in the group. Then the instances that
follow in which the subject answers in the first group position allow for hypothesis testing
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Table 3.7: Summary of Questions Used to Examine the Effect of Social Pressure
ID Question Wording Subject Position Egalitarian Inegalitarian
in Group Round Response Response
Q1
Would you be nervous if a
Muslim man were on the
same flight as you?
Last No Yes
Q2
Would you mind living in a
neighborhood where half of
your neighbors are Muslim?
Last No Yes
Q3
Do you favor special secu-
rity checks at airports for
Muslims?
Middle
Str. oppose/
Oppose
Str. favor/
Favor
Q4
Would you worry a lot, a
moderate amount, a little,
or not at all about having
a Muslim as a neighbor?
Last
A little/
Not at all
Mod. amount/
A lot
Note: Questions appear in the order that subjects encountered them in the group round, separated by a series of distraction
items. Group dynamics in the experiment are such that if a subject gave the egalitarian (inegalitarian) response in the
Individual Pre Period, peers unanimously gave the inegalitarian (egalitarian) response in the Group Period. See text for
details. ID numbers are used to refer to particular questions in the text.
about the propensity of individuals to perpetuate learned group opinion in further group
interactions. The questions of interest used to examine social pressure effects, as well as the
group dynamics with respect to these questions, are presented in Table 3.7. Question identi-
fication numbers, as well as question wording and response options in Table 3.7 correspond
exactly to those in Table 3.1.
Individual Post Period Following the Group Period, subjects were again asked to answer
a set of questionnaire items in isolation under the condition of anonymity. Other than the
specific set of distraction questions asked, this period directly mirrored the Individual Pre
Period. The purpose of this second isolation period was to allow for hypothesis testing
about the nature of the responses given across the study (importantly, whether responses
given in the group setting were carried over into the post-group setting). Survey questions
were followed by a debriefing that informed subjects of the deception employed in the study,
and then a set of questions that probed for suspicion about the deception.
73
Experimental Conditions Each subject went through the above procedure. In addition,
two factors were varied that made three slightly different experimental conditions.
1. Expectation of a Face-to-Face Meeting:
In one of the experimental conditions, subjects were given instructions that informed
them explicitly that they would not engage in any face-to-face meeting with their fellow
group members following the computer portion of the study. In two other conditions,
subjects were given instructions that included a ruse that they would have a face-to-
face meeting with the same group following the computer-based interactions. These
instructions are provided in Appendix A.
2. Priming of Negative Muslim Attitudes:
In one of the experimental conditions, subjects were asked a battery of questions
tapping attitudes about the anti-terrorism policies of the United States government.
The three experimental conditions are provided in Table 3.8. Ultimately, the differences
between the experimental conditions will not be leveraged substantially for the purposes
of hypothesis testing. The intention of telling one subset of participants that they would
not engage in a face-to-face meeting with their computer-networked group while telling
another subset that they would was to lend further evidence for the relationship posited in
General Social Conformity Hypothesis 1. This will be discussed briefly in what follows. In a
simple comparison of proportions, the difference in propensity to change responses between
conditions only worked according to the hypothesis for one of the four survey questions that
were the focus of the analysis. The intention of giving one subset of subjects a battery of
terrorism policy questions prior to the group portion and not the other subset was to test
whether this would lead to a greater number of changes in responses between the Individual
Pre Period and the Group Period. Ultimately, no such differences between conditions were
found. In the discussion that follows, breaking the subjects down into their experimental
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Table 3.8: Experimental Conditions That Result by Varying Two Factors
Expectation of a Inclusion of Terrorism
Face-to-Face Meeting Policy Questions
Condition 1 No No
Condition 2 Yes No
Condition 3 Yes Yes
conditions is primarily used to categorize them according to whether they went through
exactly the same protocol.
Results
To get an initial sense of subject responses on the questions of primary interest for the Real-
Time Social Pressure Experiment, Figure 3.6 presents the raw data on expressed attitudes
for the questions in Table 3.7. Data are separated both by experimental condition (including
a category that pools across conditions) and whether subjects gave the egalitarian response
or the inegalitarian response in the Individual Pre Period. Panel labels in the figure indicate
both the condition and the initial response given by subjects. Individual data points are
jittered for presentation purposes.
From simple visualization, the most striking feature of these data is that subjects over-
whelmingly tend to give egalitarian responses to the questions. On each question, and
across conditions, a far greater proportion of respondents initially gave the egalitarian re-
sponse than otherwise. This is not surprising given the results previously presented. There
is, however, interesting variation. On Q1, for example, only about 14% of subjects gave the
inegalitarian response in private. On Q2 over 31% of subjects did so; on Q3, about 19%
of subjects did so; and on Q4 only 2% of subjects did so. As expected, the vast majority
of subjects give the egalitarian response, regardless of the question, and regardless of the
experimental condition. But somewhat surprisingly, the question that elicited the greatest
proportion of inegalitarian responses was the question tapping concern about living in a
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Figure 3.6: Individual Responses Across Individual Pre, Group, and Individual Post Settings
in the Real-Time Social Pressure Experiment
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predominantly Muslim neighborhood, while the question that elicited the lowest proportion
tapped concern about one Muslim neighbor. This suggests that non-Muslims who encounter
these hypothetical circumstances generally do not feel compelled to express concern about
Muslims living in proximity to them until the number of Muslims reaches some threshold.
Beyond this point, such people feel comfortable enough to express their concern, against the
norm of egalitarian rhetoric.
A second obvious pattern that emerges from these data speaks directly to the question
of whether individuals tend to change their responses in the face of a unanimously opposed
majority. For Q1, Q2, and Q3 at least, the figure indicates that a large percentage of subjects
who initially provided the inegalitarian response publicly complied with the egalitarian group
response when compelled to follow their fellow group members. On the flipside, a very small
percentage of subjects who initially provided the egalitarian response in isolation ended up
changing to express the inegalitarian response in the face of an inegalitarian group majority.
For Q4, a small percentage of subjects who initially provided the egalitarian response publicly
complied with the unanimous group response, but not enough subjects initially provided an
inegalitarian response to make a meaningful comparison.
While Figure 3.6 is suggestive, Table 3.9 presents formal statistical tests of the propensity
of subjects to conform to the group response based on whether they gave the egalitarian or
the inegalitarian response in the initial private setting. These analyses pool subjects across
experimental conditions. Looking at the raw proportions who change between groupings of
initial responses, the proportions of initial inegalitarians who changed their responses in the
group round are uniformly larger than initial egalitarians. The p-values indicate that for all
questions under consideration, the proportions who change responses between the Individual
Pre Period and the Group Period among those who initially give an egalitarian response are
significantly different than among those who initially gave an inegalitarian response.
The results in Table 3.9 do not control for any subject-level characteristics, however. To
do so, Tables 3.10 and 3.11 present multivariate logistic regression models of the likelihood of
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Table 3.9: Tests of Difference in Proportions Between Egalitarian and Inegalitarian Initial
Responses
Proportion Who Change Responses
Individual Pre→ Group
Egalitarian Inegalitarian χ2(1) p-value
Q1 0.047 0.524 36.331 <0.001
Q2 0.087 0.447 23.861 <0.001
Q3 0.025 0.517 49.159 <0.001
Q4 0.054 0.667 9.238 0.002
Note: Proportions are the subset of subjects who changed responses between the Individual Pre Period and the Group Period.
For responses identified as egalitarian and inegalitarian, refer to Table 3.7. Asymptotic p-values are based on the χ2(1)
approximation of the hypergeometric null distribution (Fisher 1922) using Yates’ continuity correction (Yates 1934)
changing responses between the Individual Pre Period and the Group Period using self-report
measures from the questionnaire. Just as in the analyses in the Looming Social Pressure
Experiment, dummy variables are used to capture race, gender, and religion, while a four-
level variable is used to capture the number of years in school. In addition, these models
control for the size of the group that gathered in the common waiting area for the study on a
given date. The idea here is that because the hypothesized mechanisms of subjects altering
or masking their attitudes have to do with considerations about appearing deviant from the
broader population or the immediate social group, the number of subjects in the group could
plausibly prime some sense of sociality among the subjects and therefore induce different
behavior based on the size of the group. The models in Table 3.10 pool over responses to
all four of the questions of interest; that is, the unit of observation is the unique subject-
question combination. To control for unobserved subject characteristics, these models also
include subject-level random coefficients.
A brief scan of Table 3.10 reveals that the characteristics of individuals do not seem to add
very much explanatory value beyond what was already known. Whether the subject initially
provided the egalitarian response is a highly significant predictor of a lower probability of
changing responses in the face of group pressure. But little else of substance can be found
among the other covariates. While it is useful to control for demographic variables, the fact
that they do not seem to be systematically related to the probability of changing responses
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Table 3.10: Logistic Regression Models of Changing Responses Between Individual and
Group Rounds, Pooling Across Questions
Pooled Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Egalitarian Initial Response -3.363*** -3.328** -3.305*** -3.416***
(0.412) (1.048) (0.993) (0.510)
White -0.470 -0.900 0.152 -0.518
(0.494) (1.126) (1.230) (0.544)
Female 0.180 0.088 2.415† -0.516
(0.461) (1.019) (1.345) (0.531)
Christian -0.546 -2.455† -0.449 0.415
(0.524) (1.437) (1.116) (0.598)
Republican 0.815 0.831 1.467 -0.008
(0.550) (1.552) (1.252) (0.595)
Education 0.326 1.038† 0.603 -0.262
(0.234) (0.589) (0.477) (0.285)
Group Size 0.177 0.122 -0.417 0.624**
(0.190) (0.387) (0.463) (0.237)
Condition 2 0.484
(0.672)
Condition 3 -0.185
(0.721)
Constant -2.159 -2.161 -0.746 -2.646
(1.583) (3.444) (3.258) (1.491)
Observations 600 144 152 304
Subjects 150 36 38 76
Var(αi) 2.092 2.105 2.731 0.283
Log-likelihood -158.625 -32.927 -40.935 -72.904
Note: Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. The binary dependent variable is 1
if subject changed responses to a given question between the first individual round and the group round, and 0 otherwise. All
models include subject-level random intercepts, αi, where i indexes subjects. The unit of observation is the subject-question.
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; †p < 0.10
is not all that surprising. It is not clear a priori why gender, religion, or party identification
would be related to the probability of changing responses. We might have surmised that
education would lead to a lower probability of changing responses due to simple need for
response consistency, or that group size would lead to a higher probability of changing
responses due to the inducement of a greater sense of social pressure. But neither of these
relationships are borne out by the data at hand.
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Figure 3.7: Predicted Probabilities from Logistic Regressions Between Individual and Group
Rounds, Pooling Across Direct Questions
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Note: Predicted probabilities are based on the second, third, and fourth models in Table 3.10. Calculations are for a baseline
subject is a white, female, Christian, Republican, college freshman, and group size is held at its mean value.
The impact of the initial response, however, is substantial. To ease interpretation, Fig-
ure 3.7 presents predicted probabilities for the individual condition models from Table 3.10.
The plot illustrates the estimated effect of moving from an inegalitarian response to an egal-
itarian response while holding all of the demographic and education variables equal to one,
and holding group size at its mean value. The effect is very slight within condition one,
largely due to significant covariation with religion and education.5 In conditions two and
three, the estimated effect of providing an inegalitarian initial response is quite substantial.
In the case of condition two, the probability of changing responses between the initial private
period and the group period is only about 0.1. But if a subject initially gave the inegalitar-
ian response to a question, that probability increases to about 0.75, an increase of roughly
5Note that the coefficient estimates for Education and, especially, Christian, are substantially different
in the model for condition one as opposed to the same coefficient estimates for all other cases. Examining
the summary statistics in Appendix B, there is no obvious difference between conditions that would be
expected to lead to this anomaly. Without further investigation, the most plausible assessment is that a
small number of subjects giving the initial inegalitarian response along with a few anomalous behaviors within
religion and education categories contributed to this difference. The direction and substantive significance
of the coefficient estimate for giving the initial egalitarian response, however, is quite consistent across
specifications.
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0.65. That is, the probability goes from around a 10% chance of changing responses between
the Individual Pre Period and the Group Period when a subject initially falls in line with
the socially desirable response in the broader population to an almost 75% chance when a
subject initially goes against egalitarian norms in private. In condition three, the jump is
not quite as dramatic, but the relationship is nonetheless quite strong. In this case, the
probability of changing response between the initial private setting and the real-time social
pressure setting increases from 0.032 if a subject initially gives the egalitarian response to
just over 0.5 if a subject initially gives the inegalitarian response (an increase of about 0.47).
Momentarily setting aside the anomaly of condition one, the results lead to the conclusion
that when subjects initially express the inegalitarian attitude in private they typically have
a greater than 50% chance of changing their responses in the face of group pressure to do
so.
The results from the difference of proportion tests of the single variable and the logistic
regressions presented thus far show strong initial support for Social Dissonance Hypothesis,
and little reason to believe General Social Conformity Hypothesis 2. All signs thus far point
to the idea that if the subject initially gives a response that runs counter to known norms
in the broader population, she will be more susceptible to group pressures to provide the
opposite response. Subjects who express a view in agreement with the broader population
norm show little susceptibility to group social pressure to publicly comply with a group norm
that runs counter to the broader population norm.
Table 3.11 presents a set of similar models, but estimates each question separately, here
pooling across experimental conditions. Similar to the above analysis that pooled responses
across questions, the covariate profile in the multivariate specification offers little in the way
of explanatory power beyond the main variable of interest. The effect of the initial response,
however, remains substantial. To be sure, there is significant variation across questions in the
actual substantive impact of initially giving an egalitarian response. Holding all other factors
constant, the impact of the initial choice on the probability of changing is most substantial
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Table 3.11: Logistic Regression Models of Changing Responses Between Individual and
Group Rounds, Individual Questions
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Egalitarian Initial Response -3.548*** -2.541*** -4.329*** -2.710†
(0.743) (0.569) (0.908) (1.462)
White -0.270 -0.883† -0.260 -0.042
(0.697) (0.519) (0.772) (0.904)
Female -0.101 -0.086 0.717 0.150
(0.669) (0.497) (0.727) (0.751)
Christian -0.393 -0.758 -0.372 0.449
(0.756) (0.553) (0.810) (0.923)
Republican 0.385 0.498 -0.453 1.688†
(0.823) (0.586) (0.866) (0.869)
Education 0.088 0.361 0.706† -0.107
(0.320) (0.248) (0.400) (0.376)
Group Size 0.495† -0.057 0.242 0.242
(0.272) (0.209) (0.312) (0.299)
Condition 2 0.507 0.505 0.293 1.167
(0.915) (0.696) (1.181) (1.128)
Condition 3 -0.198 -0.991 1.000 0.595
(1.065) (0.779) (1.195) (1.209)
Constant -2.888 0.554 -3.767 -3.145
(2.136) (1.837) (2.822) (2.771)
Subjects 150 150 150 150
Log-likelihood -35.731 -56.767 -30.374 -29.361
Note: Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. The binary dependent variable is 1 if
subject changed responses to a given question between the first individual round and the group round, and 0 otherwise. The
unit of observation is the subject.
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; †p < 0.10
for Q3, followed by Q1, and then Q4 and Q2. In the cases of Q1, Q2, and Q3, this relationship
achieves the 99% level of statistical significance, while for Q4 the relationship achieves a 90%
level. The marginal significance of the effect for Q4 is somewhat expected given the results
already discussed.
Again, the substantive impact of the estimated effects can be assessed further by examining
predicted probabilities. Figure 3.8 presents predictions from each model in Table 3.11 for
moving from an egalitarian to an inegalitarian initial response, using the same representative
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assumed values for the covariate profile as discussed previously, and separating subjects by
condition. A similar pattern emerges across conditions, with some important variation. For
instance, the moderately large difference between the estimated effect of an initial egalitarian
response between condition one and conditions two and three for Q1 and Q4, and the
substantially large difference for Q3, offers some further insight into the differences between
condition one and the others exhibited in the preceding analyses. In condition one, with
no expectation of a later face-to-face meeting, subjects seem to have simply had a generally
lower baseline probability of changing responses in the face of a unanimously opposed group
attitude distribution. This lends further support to General Social Conformity Hypothesis
1. In moving from an egalitarian initial response to an inegalitarian initial response for Q1,
subjects exhibit a substantial increase in the probability of changing responses between the
initial setting and the group pressure setting that is fairly consistent across experimental
conditions (differences in probability of about 0.47 in condition one, 0.51 in condition two,
and 0.641 in condition three). For conditions two and three, the same increase in probability
for Q3 is even more dramatic (about 0.79 and 0.76, respectively). For Q2, this increase in
probability is more modest, and for Q4 even more modest still. Further, in conditions two
and three, the representative hypothetical subject who initially expresses the inegalitarian
attitude to Q1, Q3, or Q4 changes responses in the face of group pressure with a probability
approaching certainty.
In short, the results in Table 3.11 and Figure 3.8 generally offer significant credence to
the relationship posited in the Social Dissonance Hypothesis. Whether examining subject
behavior with respect to specific questions, all questions pooled together, or across or within
conditions, the subject choice to initially provide the inegalitarian response, that is, the re-
sponse that is clearly not the socially desirable one, turns out to be highly consequential in
attempting to predict whether the subject will alter that expressed attitude when encoun-
tering unanimously opposed group pressure. Subjects who initially expressed the egalitarian
attitudinal response, in agreement with the socially desirable response in the broader pop-
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Figure 3.8: Predicted Probabilities from Logistic Regressions Between Individual and Group
Rounds, Individual Questions
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ulation, are overwhelmingly likely to maintain that attitude even when they are compelled
to express it publicly in front of an audience who unanimously expresses an opposing view.
On the other hand, subjects who initially expressed the inegalitarian response, that is, the
socially unacceptable pronouncement in the broader population, are overwhelmingly likely
to alter their expressed attitude in the face of opposing group pressure.
At this point, it would be useful to further explore the mechanism underlying the propen-
sity of subjects to alter their responses between the Individual Pre Period and the Group
Period. That is, the Individual Post Period allows us to assess whether any changes in re-
sponses between the first two periods are evidence of learning and internalizing the response
given under group pressure, or whether they are evidence of preference falsification. How-
ever, because, as we have seen, altering responses under group pressure is so overwhelmingly
associated with an initial inegalitarian response, and because so few subjects actually gave
an inegalitarian response in the initial private setting, we are left with a very small sample of
subjects with whom to examine the relationship between group behavior and the following
private behavior. Therefore, the discussion that follows will necessarily only be suggestive
and preliminary.
Table 3.12 presents preliminary evidence speaking to whether the subjects who change
their expressed preferences are merely publicly complying by falsifying their preferences.
N sizes listed are the number of subjects who publicly complied with the expressed group
response. As stated, these numbers are incredibly small for formal analysis. Simply exam-
ining the raw proportions of subjects who go back to their original response after having
changed under group pressure, the strongest evidence for preference falsification lies with
Q4, while the strongest evidence for learning or on-the-fly preference formation lies with
Q3. Interestingly, for all of the questions that tap subjects’ general level of concern or worry
about being in proximity to Muslims (Q1, Q2, and Q4), over half of those who altered
their responses between the Individual Pre Period and the Group Period went back to their
original responses in the Individual Post Period. For Q3, which taps subjects’ preferences
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Table 3.12: Proportions of Subjects Who Publicly Comply by Falsifying Their Preferences
Combined Initial Responses Inegalitarian Initial Responses
Proportion Who Change Proportion Who Change
N Group→ Individual Post N Group→ Individual Post
Q1 7 0.571 5 0.800
Q2 14 0.571 12 0.583
Q3 18 0.333 9 0.333
Q4 10 0.600 2 0.000
Note: Data presented are for subjects who altered their initial responses to publicly comply with the group opinion. Data are
separated by pooling across egalitarian and inegalitarian initial responses and by focusing only on the subjects who provided
the inegalitarian response in the initial period. N sizes are the total number in each category who changed their responses
between the Individual Pre and Group periods. Proportions are the proportions in each category who change their responses
again between the Group and Individual Post periods.
for special security checks at airports for Muslim travelers, only a minority of subjects who
changed under group pressure changed back when asked again in private. Speculating for a
moment, it may be the case that subjects see security checks as more of a policy issue than
a personal feeling, and policy issues are more subject to learning and internalization than
personal feelings. This is something that can be explored further in future iterations.
I can also examine the differences between those who initially express egalitarian and
inegalitarian attitudes to the four questions. For Q1, all of the subjects who exhibited
evidence of preference falsification initially gave the inegalitarian response to the question.
For Q2, seven out of the eight subjects who changed back to their original preference initially
expressed an inegalitarian attitude. In the case of Q3, the policy question, however, the
number of initial egalitarians who change their responses is the same as the number of
initial inegalitarians who change. And for Q4, interestingly, among the 10 total subjects
who changed their responses between the Individual Pre Period and the Group Period, six
changed back to their original responses in the Individual Post Period, and all of those six
initially gave the egalitarian response to the question.
At this point, little can be said with respect to preference falsification vs. learning and
internalization because of the relatively small number of respondents who change responses
under group pressure. More data collection will be required to determine whether the pat-
terns evident now will hold in reasonable sample sizes. We cannot claim support for either
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the Attitude Internalization Hypothesis or the Preference Falsification Hypothesis. At this
point, differentiating between these two competing explanations will remain inconclusive.
Finally, and briefly, after encountering Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 in the Group Period, and
being compelled to answer in the face of group opposition to what had been expressed in
private, subjects encountered a further set of questions about Islam and Muslims for which
they found themselves in the first group position. This dynamic was included in the design
to determine whether, upon learning the distribution of responses across a variety of related
questions, the subjects would still feel compelled to alter their responses, and whether the
underlying mechanism would be similar to the mechanism evident in the situations in which
subjects answered first. That is, the basic question was whether, after some conditioning,
the tendency to publicly comply with an expected group behavior would operate in the same
way as the tendency to comply with a known group behavior.
Figure 3.9 presents the raw data for the questions in which subjects answered first in
the Group Period. It is clear that in each case, some small minority of subjects do in fact
alter their original responses when they are under the impression that others will witness
their behavior. But unlike the questions in which the subject answered last in the face of
an opposed group, no clear pattern emerges here with respect to the whether the subject
initially provided the egalitarian or inegalitarian response. This was confirmed by performing
similar statistical analyses to those presented previously. These raw data are simply offered
in the name of completeness.
Discussion
A variety of methods have been used to examine the results of the Real-Time Social Pressure
Experiment, all of which point to strong support for the Social Dissonance Hypothesis. As we
saw, and as is consistent with a large body of previous research, when a pool of subjects are
presented with a set of attitudinal questions about sensitive social issues, tapping concepts
such as religious equality, the vast majority express attitudes in favor of the egalitarian point
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Figure 3.9: Individual Responses Across Individual Pre, Group, and Individual Post Settings
in the Real-Time Social Pressure Experiment, where Subject is in First Group Position
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Q19: Based on the events of September 11th, 2001, would you favor or oppose the U.S. gov-
ernment tightening immigration laws to restrict the number of immigrants from Arab or
Muslim countries entering the United States?
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and Table 3.7.
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of view. This result was clearly borne out in the Individual Pre Period. However, in the
Group Period, interesting systematic variation became evident based on whether subjects
had initially provided the egalitarian response. Specifically, the minority of subjects who
initially provided the inegalitarian response were shown to be significantly more likely to alter
their responses when later asked to answer the same question in the face of a unanimously
opposed group opinion. In other words, on any given question tapping non-Muslim subjects’
attitudes with respect to Islam and Muslims, a large majority of subjects expressed support
for an egalitarian view. These subjects were later put into a situation in which they faced
a group opinion on the same question that unanimously supported an inegalitarian view,
and were asked to publicly express their attitude on this question again. In this case, the
overwhelmingly dominant tendency was for those subjects to resist social pressure to publicly
comply and stick with the response that they originally gave privately. However, there was
also a minority of subjects who were willing to express an inegalitarian view when they were
initially asked a given question about Islam and Muslims. Then, when they were put into a
situation in which they were compelled to state their opinion on that same question publicly
in front of a group of peers showcasing a unanimous egalitarian response, the vast majority
of these subjects altered their initial response in order to publicly comply with the group.
This relationship is quite strong, and carries across specific questions and slight variations
in the experimental protocol.
This relationship is exactly what was posited in the Social Dissonance Hypothesis. Bor-
rowing the language of cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957), social dissonance refers
not to internal inconsistencies within the individual, but rather to inconsistencies between
an opinion held by the subject and a known appropriate social response. Specifically, it
is expected that on matters of egalitarianism with respect to various groups in societies,
individuals who are willing to express an inegalitarian view in private will almost surely be
aware that the attitude that they have expressed runs counter to the expected appropriate
social response in the broader population. Because individuals have a preference for not
89
appearing deviant from the broader population, the dissonance between the inegalitarian
view expressed and the assumed social view is expected to be a salient thought in the minds
of subjects when they encounter that same question again a short time later. If the imme-
diate social group then confronts the subject with a unanimous view that falls in line with
that of the broader population, the subject’s preference for not appearing deviant will have
a tendency to overwhelm any preferences for stating what one truly believes, or even for
consistency with a view that they expressed only a short time prior. This preference is then
likely to lead to public compliance with the expressed group opinion. This expectation was
strongly supported by the results of the Real-Time Social Pressure Experiment.
With respect to the specific form that the public compliance takes, the jury is still out.
The data presented here remain inconclusive on whether the changes in responses represent
preference falsification or attitude internalization. While three out of the four questions
examined here saw a majority of subjects who changed their responses between the Individual
Pre Period and the Group Period then go back to their original response in the Individual
Post Period (on the face exhibiting evidence in favor of preference falsification), there are not
yet enough subjects who changed their responses in the first place to say with any confidence
whether this a general phenomenon.
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Chapter 4
Homophilic Agent Interactions and Network
Development: Model and Simulations
4.1 Introduction
Recent empirical research in political science has demonstrated that social networks are
both ubiquitous and highly consequential in a wide range of social and political settings (e.g.,
Fowler 2006; Fowler and Smirnov 2007; Franzese and Hays 2008; Gibson 2001; McClurg 2006;
Siegel 2009). It would therefore stand to reason that the decision-making processes by which
individuals choose to form, maintain, and break social ties is an important area of inquiry
for political scientists. Studies on random network formation have a long pedigree in physics
and mathematics (e.g., Erdo¨s and Re´nyi 1959; Rapaport 1957). More recently, scholars have
begun to take note of the specific features of social networks, and are increasingly aware
that the choices of individuals, and not simply random chance, play a crucial role in how
social networks form and change over time. A fairly large body of social science literature
is developing around the idea that individuals tend to form social relationships that are
mutually beneficial in some respect, and to sever relationships that are not beneficial (see,
e.g., Bloch and Dutta 2009; Bloch and Jackson 2007; Caroyal and Roux 2009; Goyal and
Joshi 2003; Hojman and Szeid 2008; Jackson 2008; Jackson and Wolinsky 1996; Joshi 2008),
but surprisingly little work has been done on strategic network formation in political science.
Scholars in political science have long been interested in questions such as alliance formation
(Walt 1987; Waltz 1979; Reiter 1994) and the formation of political coalitions (Adrian and
Press 1968; Grofman 1982; Laver and Shepsle 1990), processes that explicitly involve the
selection of partners to achieve political goals. But these areas of political science have not
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taken on these questions from the perspective of network formation.
Given the nature of the questions addressed by scholars of strategic network formation, and
the growing size of the body of work, the failure of political scientists to explicitly address this
literature is somewhat puzzling. I begin the process of bridging the gap between political
scientists and scholars who focus on the strategic factors influencing partner selection in
social network formation and dynamics. Specifically, in this chapter I present a simple
game theoretic model of network formation in which players earn utility by forming links
with other players. The basic framework of this model has been examined extensively
elsewhere, but I include the added feature of players with heterogeneous types across multiple
dimensions. Previous research on strategic network formation has assumed (explicitly or
implicitly) that actors play network formation games in one-dimensional issue space. Even
in the examination of non-strategic influences such as homophily—the tendency of actors to
form links with similar others—researchers are typically interested in only one dimension of
similarity. For example, previous studies employing network concepts have focused on single
dimensions such as federalism (Broschek 2010), democratization (Aleman 2009; Lee 2009),
trade and financial markets (Belleflamme and Bloch 2004; Fagiolo, Reyes, and Schiavo 2010;
Goyal and Joshi 2003; Mauleon, Song, and Vannetelbosch 2010; Saggi and Yildiz 2010;
Weber, Davis, and Lounsbury 2009), public expenditures (Jones and Breunig 2007), the
environment (Cao and Prakash 2010), and anti-smoking (Shipan and Volden 2008). This
simplifying assumption is limited in being able to explain network formation in a real-world
environment, where actors have multiple identifiable characteristics, e.g., language, religion,
sex, race, political, social, and economic ideology, and so on (Breton et al. 1995; Brown 2000;
Kellas 1998; Smith 1998). If similarity can be defined on multiple dimensions, strategic actors
may have incentives to form relationships with others as similar to themselves as possible.
The study of preferences and behaviors over multidimensional space has a long history in
political science, but has been examined very little in specifically network-analytic settings.
In this chapter, I model these more complicated situations by introducing the notion
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of player types in two-dimensional space. After deriving some insight from this model by
examining its properties in a very simple setting, I then use the outcome of the link formation
game as the initial state of a network whose structure is allowed to change over time as a
function of the utility-maximizing behavior of agents. I show that with random initial
conditions, the networks that emerge can have very different forms and can lead to rather
large differences in both individual and social utility for the agents.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section I present the model of link formation.
I then apply the model to a simple case with a small number of agents. In the section
that follows, I present a numerical experiment of network change over time and examine the
results. I follow this with some concluding remarks.
4.2 Strategic Model of Network Formation
In this section, I consider a model of the formation of network links in which agents receive
positive utility by forming links with others similar to themselves, and negative utility by
forming relationships with dissimilar others, where similarity can be defined in multiple di-
mensions. This setup is motivated by social and political situations in which agents may
have objectives over multiple issue dimensions, and they feel compelled to form social re-
lationships in order to achieve them. Let us say that preferences over multiple dimensions
define agents’ types. With sufficient variation in the distribution of types in the population,
clearly situations will arise in which agents agree with others on some dimensions but not
others. Additionally, as many scholars have pointed out previously, actors may be limited in
their abilities to gather information and to process the information gathered. In the setting
examined here, without perfect information about the distribution of types, situations may
arise in which agents are indirectly connected with individuals with whom they are opposite
on all dimensions.
93
4.2.1 Simultaneous Link-Announcement Game with
Heterogeneous Agents
Following Myerson (1977), and using the terminology and notation of Jackson (2008), I define
the simultaneous link-announcement game as the game in which all players simultaneously
and independently announce the set of players with whom they wish to form links. Links
are formed when any two players announce that they want to be linked with one another.
For the set of players, N = {1, . . . , n}, the strategy space for player i ∈ N is the power set
of N\{i}, denoted Si. If si ∈ Si is the strategy played by player i and sj ∈ Sj is the strategy
played by player j, link ij forms if and only if i ∈ sj and j ∈ si. Further, define G(N) as the
set of all undirected networks on N , define g ∈ G(N), and let s = {s1, . . . , sn} be the profile
of strategies played. Then the network that forms in the simultaneous link-announcement
game is g(s) = {ij|i ∈ sj and j ∈ si}.
Players in the model are endowed with a two-dimensional vector of types, Θ = (θ1, θ2),
where θk ∈ {0, 1}, and k = 1, 2 indexes dimensions. Player i’s payoff for strategy profile s is
then given by the following distance-based utility function (Bloch and Jackson 2007):
ui(s) =
∑
j 6=i:j∈Nn−1i (g)
b(`ij(g))φij − di(g)cm (4.1)
where Nn−1i (g) = Ni(g)∪
(⋃
j∈Ni(g) N
n−2
j (g)
)
represents all nodes that can be reached from
i by walks (i.e., sequences of links connecting sequences of nodes) of length no more than
n − 1, `ij(g) is the shortest path between i and j in g, and b : {1, 2, . . . , n − 1} −→ IR+ is
the net benefit that a player receives from direct and indirect connections. Additionally,
φij =

2a if θi1 = θ
j
1, θ
i
2 = θ
j
2;
a if θi1 = θ
j
1, θ
i
2 6= θj2 or θi1 6= θj1, θi2 = θj2;
−a if θi1 6= θj1, θi2 6= θj2,
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for a > 0, where superscripts index players. The first term of the utility function therefore
ensures that players receive the highest utility for forming direct connections with other
players of the same type.
In the second part of the utility function, di(g) is the degree of player i in network g, that
is, the number of agent i’s direct links, and cm is the cost of maintaining a link. This cost
is intended to capture the intuitive idea that maintaining large networks of connections can
be costly.
4.2.2 Illustration: Four Agents and Four Types
To illustrate some of the properties of the simultaneous link-announcement game with het-
erogeneous agents, consider the simple case of a four-agent society in which each of the
four possible types are represented. Specifically, let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and let Θ1 = {1, 1},
Θ2 = {0, 1}, Θ3 = {1, 0}, and Θ4 = {0, 0}. For any given player, I refer to any other player
who differs on both dimensions of Θi as an opposite type, who differs on exactly one dimen-
sion of Θi as a one-type match, and who is the same on both dimensions of Θi as a same
type. For simplicity, let a = 1, let cm = 0 (forming links is costless), and let b(x) =
n−x
n−1 , so
that b(1) = 1, b(2) = 2/3, and b(3) = 1/3. This simplification allows for trivial calculations
while retaining a sensible notion of distance-based utility (Bloch and Jackson 2007).
In the four-agent case, there exist six possible dyads, and therefore
(
6
6
)
+
(
6
5
)
+
(
6
4
)
+
(
6
3
)
+(
6
2
)
+
(
6
1
)
+
(
6
0
)
= 64 possible networks that could arise from any given strategy profile.
Figure 4.1 presents these possibilities. It is important to note that the simultaneous link-
announcement game requires that each player involved in a link announces that she wants to
form a link with the other. The fully connected network, therefore, can only arise from one
strategy profile: the profile in which each player announces a desire to form a link with every
other player. Each of the other possible network structures, however, can arise from multiple
strategy profiles. So for instance, the second network in the first row of Figure 4.1 can arise
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Figure 4.1: Possible Outcomes of the Simultaneous Link-announcement Game with Four
Actors.
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Note: Panels represent the 64 possible networks that arise for various strategy profiles in the simultaneous link-announcement
game with four actors.
from a strategy profile in which neither player 3 nor player 4 announces a desire to link with
the other, or the strategy profiles in which only one of these players announces a desire to
link with the other. For more sparsely connected networks, the number of corresponding
strategy profiles becomes very large.
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Given the nature of players’ utility calculations, not all of the networks in Figure 4.1 are
sensible. In particular, forming a link with an opposite-type player leads to negative utility.
It is then immediately clear that any strategy that involves announcing a desire to form
a link with an opposite type is weakly dominated, and regardless of the solution concept
employed should not be predicted to occur. We may therefore speculate that any networks
involving connections between players 1 and 4 and between players 2 and 3 are unlikely to
occur. Using the concept of Nash stability, this is in fact the case. Following Jackson (2008),
I define a network g to be Nash stable if it results from a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of the simultaneous link-announcement game, where player i’s payoff as a function of the
strategy profile is given in Equation (4.1). The full set of Nash stable networks in the four-
player simultaneous link-announcement game with four types represented are presented in
Figure 4.2.
At least one problem with deriving predictions from the simultaneous link-announcement
game is that it has many Nash equilibria (Jackson 2008). In particular, Figure 4.2 shows
that one-quarter of the 64 possible outcomes of the game are Nash stable networks. To
refine the concept of stability in mutual-consent relationships, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)
introduced the notion of pairwise stability to account for the idea that if any two players
want to form a link, then such a link should be an expected outcome even in non-cooperative
settings. Introducing the notation (g − ij) to mean the network that results by removing
link ij from network g and (g + ij) to mean the network that results by adding link ij to
network g, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) define a network g as pairwise stable if:
(i) ∀ ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥ ui(g − ij) and uj(g − ij), and
(ii) ∀ ij 6∈ g, if ui(g + ij) > ui(g), then uj(g + ij) < uj(g)
A network that is both Nash stable and pairwise stable is referred to as pairwise Nash stable.
Pairwise stable networks can sometimes be overconnected, in that some player might benefit
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Figure 4.2: Nash Stable and Pairwise Nash Stable Outcomes of the Simultaneous Link-
announcement Game with Four Actors and Four Types Represented.
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Note: Panels are the subset of networks from Figure 4.1 that are Nash stable or pairwise Nash stable.
by deleting multiple links at once (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996; Jackson 2008), but it has
been argued elsewhere that pairwise Nash stability is a reasonable notion of network stability
in a large variety of settings (e.g., Bloch and Jackson 2007; Calvo´-Armengol and Ilkilic¸ 2009;
Goyal and Joshi 2003; Belleflamme and Bloch 2004). In this simple representation of the
simultaneous link-announcement game, the only pairwise stable network is the network in
which each player is connected to both of her one-type matches in the population. This is
pictured in the bottom right panel of Figure 4.2.
The unique pairwise Nash stable network in this simple setting seems reasonable on the
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face. Each player’s direct links provide positive utility. Each player is also indirectly con-
nected to her opposite type, but indirect links are sufficiently discounted. It must be kept in
mind, however, that the results are specific to the fact that there are only four players and
that all four types are represented. The example can provide intuition about situations with
larger populations in which types are equally distributed across agents, and forming links is
costless. In these situations, we will find the unique pairwise Nash stable network to be the
one in which all agents are connected to all of their same-type and one-type matches, and no
direct links exist between opposite types. However, when types are not equally distributed,
when link formation is costly, and when agents are not able to form links with any other
agent in the society, expectations about the networks that should arise become quite difficult
to describe analytically. To examine settings such as these I employ a series of numerical
experimentss.
4.3 Numerical Experiments
In the numerical experiments that follow, I consider an extension of the simultaneous link-
announcement game presented in the previous section. Specifically, agents are initially dis-
tributed across geographic space and are able to observe and form links only with other
agents within a specified distance band. After the initial formation of links according to
the simultaneous link-announcement game, I allow for the possibility that agents’ types are
influenced by the other agents to whom they are connected (Page 2007), and that this influ-
ence is a function of the utility received by others and of the strength of agents’ types. As the
relationships persist over time, more successful partners are more likely to be influential than
less successful partners. This influence can be thought of in terms of explicit imitation of
success (e.g., Schlag 1998; Young 1998), or simply as a more subconscious process of success
having greater social influence than failure. Based on changes in types, the potential utility
of links, and costs for forming and severing links, agents make decisions in each time period
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about whether to reform their current set of links. As in the initial formation model, links
in each period result from a mutual desire by the actors involved, and the resulting network
confers utility on the actors based on their system of direct and indirect connections. Be-
cause agents are able only to observe other agents within a specified geographic distance, the
formation of direct links is characterized by a great deal of uncertainty about the indirect
connections that may result. Indirect connections with opposite types are therefore likely,
and they impose negative externalities on those indirect connections.
Formally, agents are characterized by a two-dimensional vector, Zi = (xi, yi), representing
their location in two-dimensional geographic space, a two-dimensional vector of latent types,
Σi = (σ1i, σ2i), and a two-dimensional vector of observed types, Θi = (θ1i, θ2i). In the
initial stage of the model, xi, yi, σ1i, σ2i ∼ U [0, 1], and latent types lead to observed types
θ1i, θ2i ∈ {0, 1}, such that if σki ≥ 0.5 then θki = 1, and if σki < 0.5 then θki = 0, k = 1, 2.
Latent types are intended to capture the strength of agents’ types, such that latent type
values close to 0.5 represent weakly held observed types, and values close to 0 or 1 represent
strongly held types.
Agents have the ability to form links with a subset of other agents. Each agent’s potential
partners are those within a given distance, l. Agents are located on a torus to correct for
the possibility of edge effects. Practically, this means that agents who would appear to be
on opposite edges of a two-dimensional grid are actually close to one another in geographic
distance.
I define pi as an actor-specific parameter that determines the relative weight given to
temporal autoregression (the influence of an agent’s own state in the previous period), and
the relative weight given to network influences (the influence of an agent’s neighborhood
of direct connections), and is based on the utilities in each actor’s neighborhood of direct
connections, where utilities are again calculated according to Equation (4.1). Specifically,
pi =
ui(g)−uNi(1)(g)
u
Ni
(n)
(g)−uNi
(1)
(g)
, where ui(g) is actor i’s utility, and u
Ni
(1)(g) and u
Ni
(n)(g) are the minimum
and maximum utilities, respectively, among actor i’s neighborhood of direct connections.
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Therefore, if agent i has the highest utility in her neighborhood, pi = 1, and if she has the
lowest, pi = 0.
Let t ∈ {1, 2, . . .} denote time periods. Types are then updated according to
σki,t+1 = pi,tσki,t + (1− pi,t)
∑
j 6=i δijσkj,t
m− 1
for k = 1, 2, where m is number of members of actor i’s direct-link neighborhood, and δij = 1
if j is directly linked to i, and 0 otherwise. Agents with relatively higher utilities are therefore
expected to remain relatively similar to their own latent type in the previous period, whereas
agents with relatively lower utilities are expected to be more heavily influenced by the latent
types in their neighborhood.
After types are updated in each period, new utilities are calculated, and actors make deci-
sions about whether to reform their network connections. Actors observe the portion of their
realized utility that is derived from each actor to which they are directly connected. Using
this information, actors determine whether they wish to maintain their current connections.
If the utility derived from a particular link is greater in magnitude than the cost of severing
that link, then an actor wishes to maintain that relationship. For potential connections to
whom the actor is not currently connected, actors make expected utility calculations just
as in the initial network formation stage. With the information about current connections
and the projections about potential new connections, all actors announce a new profile of
potential links. If a connection appears in two actors’ profiles, a link between the two is
formed or maintained. Otherwise, the link does not form or is severed.
Results
Using the model description in the previous section, I ran a series of simulations varying
the costs of forming and severing links to derive conclusions from a wide variety of settings.
Specifically, I focus on four basic conditions: (1) low-cost link formation, low-cost link sev-
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Figure 4.3: Individual-level Utility Trajectories for Low-cost Link Formation and Low-cost
Link Severance
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Note: Lines are individual utility levels at each iteration.
erance; (2) low-cost link formation, high-cost link severance; (3) high-cost link formation,
low-cost link severance; (4) high-cost link formation, high-cost link severance. For each of
these conditions, I ran five simulations over ten time iterations.
Of particular interest are questions of whether players become locked into various levels of
utility after some initial set of moves, and whether initial conditions can be used to predict
the types of outcomes that are possible. As an illustration, Figure 4.3, presents individual-
level utility trajectories for the five simulation runs of low-cost link formation and low-cost
link severance. A brief examination of the figures indicates that a variety of outcomes are in
fact possible depending upon the initial configuration of actors across geography and across
types. In particular, we see that in each simulation run, actors become broken into particular
regimes of utility levels. In three of the five simulations, a set of individuals breaks away
from the pack, performing significantly better than the other agents in the society. There is
always a small group of players that never moves away from a utility of zero–agents that fail
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Figure 4.4: Individual-level Utility Trajectories for High-cost Link Formation and High-cost
Link Severance
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Note: Lines are individual utility levels at each iteration.
to form links for the entire time period analyzed. Then a series of agent blocs form early
and remain stable around several levels of positive utility. In the three simulations in which
a clear outlier group of high utility emerges, the groups of agents at the intermediate levels
of utility top off at roughly between one-third and one-half of the utility level of the outlier
group. Agents receiving negative utility seems to be a rare phenomenon, and looks to be
self-correcting. That is, agents who receive negative utility tend to quickly and universally
move back into the realm of non-negative utility.
To illustrate that these general conclusions are not specific to the situation of low-cost
link formation and low-cost link severance, Figure 4.4 presents the individual-level utility
trajectories for high-cost link formation and high-cost link severance. The general description
of the results for this condition is quite similar to that of the previous condition. We once
again see that various regimes of intermediate levels of positive utility form, and on occasion
we observe a break-out group that performs significantly better than the rest of the society.
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Actual levels of utility are quite similar to the previous condition, if slightly higher on average.
The third panel of Figure 4.4 demonstrates an anomaly for this particular set of simulations.
In particular, at time period 8, the group of agents with the highest level of utility, along
with a subset of an intermediate group, are able to jump to a coalescence around a higher
level of utility. Across the 20 simulations performed for this analysis, this was the latest that
the ultimate high level of utility was reached, and represents one of the only times that such
a jump occurred after a group had seemingly been in a steady state for several periods.
The individual-level trajectories for low-cost link formation, high-cost link severance, and
high-cost link formation, low-cost link severance are not presented here due to space con-
straints. But suffice to say that the general description of the results do not change signifi-
cantly depending upon the condition. The highest individual-levels of utility are experienced
when severing links carries high costs, regardless of whether the formation of links carries a
high or low cost. This would seem to suggest that the myopia of the agents, when combined
with low-cost of link severance, leads to agents severing relationships predicted to be costly
in the short-term that could potentially carry greater benefits in the long-term. Addition-
ally, agents do not become trapped in negative levels of utility because though the severance
of links carries a cost, it never carries a greater cost than the negative utility experienced.
Agents are almost always able to break free from costly relationships in a matter of one
period. Overall, the most striking and consistent feature of the sets of individual-level tra-
jectories is that but for a few individuals, agents quickly lock into a particular level of utility
resulting from a set of mutually beneficial network connections. Short-term considerations
and structural constraints insure that agents would be wise not to break their existing links,
but they also find themselves unable to form links that might continue to move the utility
trajectories of themselves and their groups to a higher level.
The visualization of the utility trajectories brings up interesting questions about whether
the random initial conditions lock players into states from which they are unable to break
out. In the model, there is nothing particularly advantageous for an agent in being one
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Table 4.1: ANOVA Models of Individual Utility in the Final Period, Conditioning on Initial
Types
Formation Severance Simulation
Cost Cost Number F p-value
Low Low 1 4.183 0.008
Low Low 2 6.830 0.000
Low Low 3 4.861 0.003
Low Low 4 2.545 0.061
Low Low 5 2.466 0.067
Low High 1 5.873 0.001
Low High 2 1.414 0.244
Low High 3 3.656 0.015
Low High 4 8.641 0.000
Low High 5 7.289 0.000
High Low 1 2.355 0.077
High Low 2 7.419 0.000
High Low 3 6.850 0.000
High Low 4 7.683 0.000
High Low 5 1.852 0.143
High High 1 1.956 0.126
High High 2 2.793 0.044
High High 3 2.594 0.057
High High 4 4.150 0.008
High High 5 3.753 0.013
Note: F -statistics are derived from a one-way analysis of variance, conditioning on types in the initial period. Response variable
is utility in the final period. p-values are based on F (3, 96).
type or another, except as this relates to the subpopulation of other agents who are in
close proximity. If the initial distribution of types across geographic space does not confer
benefits upon one group or another, then we should not expect agents’ types in the initial
stage to be significant predictors of agents’ utilities in the final stage. As a first step toward
examining this relationship, Table 4.1 presents the results of hypothesis tests from one-way
analysis of variance models for each simulation, in which the response variable is utility in the
final period, and the predictor is initial type. Sums of squares are omitted for presentational
purposes. The p-values indicate that except for a few exceptional cases, initial type is at least
a marginally statistically significant predictor of the ultimate utilities. In short, far more
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often than not, the mean values of final utilities for the four different initial types differ by
more than should be expected by chance. These results indicate not that any particular
group has an advantage in general, but rather that for any given set of initial conditions, an
agent’s type is consequential for the long-run level of utility that can be expected.
Looking more closely at the individual-level dynamics of the model, we find that in any
given simulation, the type updating rule based on the relative utilities in an agent’s neigh-
borhood leads to the organization of agents into one dominant group. This is a universal
result across the series of simulations employed here. After beginning with a relatively bal-
anced distribution of agents across types, agents form connections, utilities are received and
observed, and types are updated. The continuation of this process leads to the relatively suc-
cessful types in the society having a great deal of influence over the types of their neighbors,
eventually having a sort of cascading effect.
Figure 4.5 illustrates this process for one simulation run of the low-cost formation, low-
cost severance condition. In each row, the first panel indicates the time period, the second
panel displays the utilities received from the network of links in that time period, and the
third panel displays agents’ degree centrality (a count of the agents’ numbers of direct links).
Each of the latter two panels are broken down by agent type. Examining the change from
t = 0 to t = 1, the number of type changes is immediately dramatic. Types (1,0) and (0,1) in
particular lose a significant portion of their original members, and the number of Type (0,0)
agents grows substantially. By t = 5, the change is even more dramatic, and by the final
period, no agents are left of Type (0,1). Examining the upper left and lower left panels of the
utility calculations at t = 1 gives a hint to how this may have occurred. Type (0,1) agents
would typically desire to form connections with Type (1,1) agents and Type (0,0) agents (in
addition to their own type matches). The utility calculations after the initial period place
Type (0,0) agents at the highest utility levels, on average, whereas Type (1,1) agents reside
at the lowest utility levels. Type (0,1) agents with connections to both other types would
then be more heavily influenced by the Type (0,0) agents. This process continues until Type
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Figure 4.5: Utilities and Centrality by Agent Type Over Time, Low-cost Formation, Low-
cost Severance Condition.
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Note: Rows indicate individual utilities and degree centrality at specified time step (iteration) for each type.
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(0,1) agents are completely absent.
In this example, as in other simulations not presented, the final dominance of one type
does not indicate that the members of that type perform universally better than members
of the minority types. Members of the dominant group do receive higher utility on average,
but they also become stuck in low-utility trajectories.
The degree centrality panels of Figure 4.5 indicate that in the first several time periods, the
relationship between the number of links and the level of utility is not immediately apparent.
The relationship only begins to emerge as the dominant type emerges. Because by the final
period, the dominant type makes up an overwhelming proportion of the population, the
relationship between the number of connections and utility received remains unclear. And it
is important to keep in mind at this point that this example is representative of the outcomes
that obtained across simulations.
Given that random initial conditions seem to be consequential for individual utility trajec-
tories, it stands to reason that they may also be consequential for the social welfare obtained
by the society as a whole. In the model employed here, agents are not dividing utility across
a fixed pie, but rather returns are allowed to increase indefinitely until all types are the same,
and the network is fully connected subject to the imposed geographic constraints. Given a
random array of initial agents, therefore, the set of possible outcomes for a society would
appear to be wide ranging. This is, in fact, what is found here. Figure 4.6 presents the tra-
jectories of social utility for each of the simulations discussed. I operationalize social utility
as simply the sum total of utility across agents at each time period. For each combination
of costs of link formation and link severance, the total of five social utility trajectories are
presented. The figure illustrates that even for a very small number of simulations across the
various conditions, a wide variety of social outcomes obtain. The highest stable trajectory
of social utility occurred in the low-cost formation, low-cost severance condition, and the
lowest stable trajectory occurred in the high-cost formation, low-cost severance condition.
But the relationship between the costs of formation and severance and social utility remain
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Figure 4.6: Observed Social Utilities Across Five Simulations Each of Four Conditions of
Link Formation and Link Severance Costs
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Note: Lines in each panel are the sums of individual utilities for each of 5 simulations performed under the specified conditions.
unclear. The relatively large vertical separation between trajectories in each panel indicates
that if initial conditions are randomly given, the social outcomes that can be expected will
be very difficult to predict.
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The simulation results suggest a clear avenue for future inquiry: studying the specific
sets of initial conditions that can be expected to lead to particular individual and social
outcomes. The analyses of model results presented here only scratch the surface of the
possible questions that can be addressed with this type of model. Because initial conditions
are randomly assigned in these simulations, the wide variety of outcomes in any one condition
suggest that the particular initial values are likely to be consequential.
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion
Random network formation has a long pedigree in mathematics and the physical sciences,
and the amount of scholarship on models that account for individual choices in social network
formation are growing rapidly. However, though political science has long been concerned
with the use of social network concepts to explain various aspects of political behavior, the
discipline is a relative latecomer to the specific study of strategic network formation. Models
of the strategic formation of social and political relationships would seem to be a natural
fit for political scientists interested in such substantive areas as the formation of political
coalitions, the formation of military alliances, and the formation of trade relationships,
particularly given the popularity and importance of these topics. In this chapter, I have
attempted to take a small step toward a greater understanding of strategic network formation
in areas of interest to political scientists.
Specifically, the chapter is concerned with situations in which actors have incentives to
form relationships with similar others, but in which similarity is defined over multiple di-
mensions. The study of models of decision and choice in multi-dimensional issue space has
generated a great deal of work in political science. But such questions have been studied very
little in specifically network-related terms. Likewise, studies of strategic network formation
have given a great deal of attention to the formation of social ties between individuals with
similar characteristics and goals, but little work in this area has explicitly considered sim-
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ilarity in multiple dimensions. By bridging these two areas of scholarly inquiry, both have
great potential to benefit.
I began with a simple model of network formation via a non-cooperative game of si-
multaneous announcement of links by players. The simultaneous link formation game was
developed elsewhere (Myerson 1977), and has been studied extensively (see, e.g., Jackson
2008). But I added the feature of agents who are heterogeneous over a two-dimensional
space of types. A simple example demonstrated that under a very simple configuration, a
large set of equilibrium predictions obtain using the na¨ıve solution concept of Nash stability,
but a unique prediction obtains under the refinement of pairwise Nash stability (Jackson
and Wolinsky 1996). I stress, however, that the existence of a unique pairwise Nash stable
network depends upon the simplicity of the example. Situations characterized by larger
numbers of players and varying distributions of types lead to a multiplicity of predictions
about the stable networks that can be expected to emerge.
Using the simultaneous link-announcement game as a basis, I then employed numerical
simulations to examine the dynamics of network change when agents are myopic and have
a limited ability to form ties with others, when the forming and severing of links is costly,
when the initial distribution of types in two-dimensional space is randomly assigned, and
when agents are allowed to influence and be influenced by others’ types as a function of
success. A wide array of results obtain at both the individual and societal levels, making
general conclusions about the relationships between various conditions difficult. Across
simulations, individuals and the society as a whole tended to lock into particular levels of
utility fairly early in the process and remain there for the duration. Additionally, there was
a strong tendency for the influence of neighbors’ types as a function of success to lead to one
type overwhelmingly dominating the final population of agents. The variation in possible
outcomes in terms of both individual and social utility suggest that the randomly assigned
initial conditions may be highly consequential.
This naturally will lead to future inquiry about the specific initial conditions that lead to
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particular types of outcomes. From this relatively basic model, it is possible to examine a
very large set of possible initial circumstances. The representation presented here, therefore,
has opened the door to a fruitful line of future research.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In the contemporary industrialized world, norms of appropriate social behavior dictate that
on questions of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and so on, support for egalitarian principles is
the only acceptable mode of mainstream social and political behavior. And not surprisingly,
citizens, especially those with greater awareness about and knowledge of the political system,
express high levels of support for egalitarian principles across issue domains. But it remains a
constant struggle for empirical researchers to determine the truth and falsehoods underlying
those responses.
The main source of the trouble is the understanding that humans have a strong desire to
not appear to be deviant from those around them, especially when those around them are
able to witness their behavior. It is that desire that leads to the thought that in a public
setting, when asked to publicly express a view on a sensitive social issue like racial equality,
some substantial portion of citizens are likely to falsify their true preferences in favor of
the actual or perceived distribution of preferences in the group. To the extent that many
individuals feel this way, widespread preference falsification might be expected to ensue.
In three essays, this dissertation explored various aspects of the relationship between in-
terpersonal interactions and the behaviors that individuals are willing to exhibit in public
settings. The first essay did so by examining behavior in situations in which actors were
compelled to exhibit some behavior in non-self-selected settings. The model was quite ab-
stract, and could potentially be applied to a variety of different settings in which individuals
might experience some level of tension between intrinsic and extrinsic preferences. But the
model was interpreted in the context of changing norms of racial rhetoric witnessed in the
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United States in the latter part of the twentieth century. In the second essay, I explored a
series of laboratory experiments on social influence and group pressure to conform. These
studies showed general support for what I termed the Social Dissonance Hypothesis, which
essentially states that individuals will be more likely to alter the behavior that they previ-
ously exhibited in private when that behavior runs counter to prevailing social norms. More
generally, the experiments demonstrated an asymmetric effect of social pressure in which
those subjects who gave inegalitarian responses were more likely than subjects who initially
gave egalitarian responses to change their behavior in the face of social pressure to do so.
The third essay moved away from situations in which individuals were exogenously assigned
to networks of relationships and examined a setting in which individuals make decisions to
form relationships and networked populations are allowed to develop endogenously. Using
random initial parameter values in this setting leads to a wide variety of possible outcomes
at both the individual and societal levels.
These essays provide the foundation for future work on social influence. Future research
will have to more closely integrate the experimental and simulation portions in order to
provide empirical support to a wide variety of long, over-time processes.
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Appendix A
Experimental Instructions
Here I present the instructions read to participants and the laboratory materials used in the
experiments described in Chapter 3.
A.1 The Looming Social Pressure Experiment
After all participants in a given session had gathered in a common waiting room and filled
out a consent form to participate, the researcher recited to the group the following set of
instructions:
Today you are participating in a study on group and individual decision making. The
first part of the session will take place on these computer terminals. So you all can
each choose an open terminal. You should go into the room and shut the door. I am
going to come around to you one-by-one and give you instructions. It may take a few
minutes for me to get to you. You may read or use the computer while you wait for me.
But you will find that there is a web browser open and minimized on your computer.
Don’t touch that until I tell you to do so. So go ahead and choose a computer. What
you are going to do has to be coordinated with the other group of participants, so I
have to go make sure that everything is ready in the other room.
As the participants filed into the computer terminals and closed the door, the researcher
left the room. After a period of one to two minutes, the researcher returned, walked into
each terminal, one-by-one, and recited the following set of instructions:
Part of what we are interested in here today is what happens in group decision-making
situations when people are able to learn a little bit about one another before they get
together in groups to do something.
So there is a group of people in another room who have filled out a questionnaire with
a series of public opinion questions. I have selected six of the questions at random, and
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I am going to give you a computer printout of four people’s answers. You have been
assigned to be in a group with these four people for something that happens later.
The people participating in the experiment today have been assigned different roles.
For the purposes of this study, the only difference between the people in this room
and the people in the other room is that the people in the other room filled out the
questionnaire without knowing anything about the group part of the study. You have
a different role in that you will be allowed to learn a little bit about your fellow group
members before you do anything for the study.
[Researcher points to the top page of a stack of computer printouts (refer to Figure 3.1).]
On the printout, you’ll see a survey question along with the set of responses, and then
you’ll see an X marked next to the other person’s answers. Other people are identified
only by a participant number in the upper right corner of the printout. And for this
study, you are participant number 11.
So I will leave these printouts of the other people’s answers with you for a couple of
minutes. Just look them over and I’ll be right back after I give these instructions to
a few other people. [Researcher hands stack of printouts to subject, leaves the room,
and closes the door.]
The researcher then left the room to give the instructions to another subject. After all
subjects were given the above set of instructions, the researcher began again with the first
subject, walked into each terminal, and recited the following set of instructions:
So now you are going to fill out the same questionnaire that your fellow group members
already completed. When you’re finished, there will be a brief break for you, and at
that time I am going to give your fellow group members a similar printout about you.
After that, you will go through a group task that takes just a few minutes.
The questionnaire has about 60 questions on it, and it generally takes people about
25 to 30 minutes to complete. You’ll answer this, and then there will be a short break
before the group task. And the software should provide all of the instructions that you
need as you navigate through the questionnaire. Just read everything very carefully
and go ahead and get started.
A.2 The Real-Time Social Pressure Experiment
Two experimental conditions were administered via instructions given to the group of sub-
jects prior to the beginning of the computer portion of the study. In one condition, subjects
were told that they would meet in a face-to-face setting following the computer portion of
the study (Condition 2), and in another they were told that they would not engage in any
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face-to-face tasks (Condition 1). The following is the instruction script read to subjects.
Language present in both sets of instructions appears in regular text, language present only
in Condition 1 appears in italics, and language present only in Condition 2 appears in bold-
face.
Welcome.
Today you are going to be participants in a broader research study on individual and
group decision making. What you do today will be used to compare across a variety of
situations in which individuals make decisions in individual settings, in group settings
over a computer network, and in face-to-face group settings.
Today, you will not be involved in any face-to-face tasks. That is, you will engage
in some tasks as individuals, and then some more tasks in groups over the computer
network, and then you’ll be finished. Today, you will do some of all three of
these. That is, you will engage in some tasks as individuals, some more
tasks in groups over the computer network, and then some more tasks in
face-to-face groups.
The study today will take place on these computer terminals. The first part of the
study today will take place on these computer terminals. You will first go
through some questions as an individual. Then following the individual questioning,
you will be assigned to a group of other people participating in the study today, and go
through some similar questions as a group. The software will assign people to groups
based on when people finish the individual portion, so you may have to wait a few
minutes as people finish the first part. Then after the group portion finishes, you’ll go
through a second short round of questioning as an individual. Then the software will
instruct you that you are finished and that you can come out into the common area.
Then you will be finished with the computer portion of the study, and the
software will instruct you to come out in the common area and meet your
computer-networked group face to face. At that point you will go through
another very brief set of tasks as a group. And then you’ll be finished. In
total, this generally takes people about 40-50 minutes to go through.
Does anyone have any questions? [Q&A]
So to reiterate, you’re going to sit at a computer terminal, then go through a set
of individual tasks, a set of computer-networked group tasks, then another set of
individual tasks. Then the software will instruct you that you are finished. Then
you’ll come out of the computer terminal and meet the same group face to
face, and go through a brief set of tasks together.
So go ahead and choose a computer terminal. You will find instructions already on the
screen. Just read everything very carefully, and the software should lead you through
the whole process on the computer and let you know when to come out. Go ahead and
begin and just read everything very carefully. And I am going to come around and
shut your doors.
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Appendix B
Summary Statistics From Experiments
The following tables present summary statistics for the subjects who participated in the
experiments described in Chapter 3.
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Table B.1: Summary Frequency Distributions of Categorical Variables for Subjects in the
Looming Social Pressure Experiment
Race: White Black Asian Other Total
Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct.
Control 112 75.68 8 5.41 19 12.84 9 6.08 148 100
Treatment 40 75.47 3 5.66 5 9.43 5 9.43 53 100
Gender: Female Male Total
Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct.
Control 40 27.21 107 72.79 147 100
Treatment 25 47.17 28 52.83 53 100
Religion: Chris. Non-Christ. Total
Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct.
Control 99 67.81 47 32.19 146 100
Treatment 38 71.70 15 28.30 53 100
Party ID: Dem. Ind. Rep. Oth. Total
Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct.
Control 56 38.10 26 17.69 41 27.89 24 16.33 147 100
Treatment 29 54.72 8 15.09 9 16.98 7 13.21 53 100
Ideology: Lib. Mod. Con. Oth. Total
Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct.
Control 49 33.11 55 37.16 37 25.00 7 4.73 148 100
Treatment 18 33.96 20 37.74 10 18.87 5 9.43 53 100
Education: 1st Yr. 2nd Yr. 3rd Yr. 4th Yr.+ Total
Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct.
Control 60 40.54 48 32.43 27 18.24 13 8.78 148 100
Treatment 36 67.93 10 18.87 4 7.55 3 5.66 53 100
Note: All measures are self reports. For each category of each variable, the first column gives the frequency, and the second
column gives the percentage.
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Table B.2: Summary Frequency Distributions of Categorical Variables for Subjects in the
Real-Time Social Pressure Experiment
Race: White Black Asian Other Total
Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct.
Cond. 1 26 72.22 2 5.56 6 16.67 2 5.56 36 100
Cond. 2 29 76.32 1 2.63 7 18.42 1 2.63 38 100
Cond. 3 49 64.47 7 9.21 11 14.47 9 11.84 76 100
Gender: Female Male Total
Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct.
Cond. 1 19 52.78 17 47.22 36 100
Cond. 2 21 55.26 17 44.74 38 100
Cond. 3 36 47.37 40 52.63 76 100
Religion: Chris. Non-Christ. Total
Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct.
Cond. 1 22 61.11 14 38.89 36 100
Cond. 2 18 47.37 20 52.63 38 100
Cond. 3 43 56.58 33 43.42 76 100
Party ID: Dem. Ind. Rep. Oth. Total
Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct.
Cond. 1 16 44.44 8 22.22 8 22.22 4 11.11 36 100
Cond. 2 25 65.79 5 13.16 7 18.42 1 2.63 38 100
Cond. 3 32 42.11 9 11.84 26 34.21 9 11.84 76 100
Ideology: Lib. Mod. Con. Oth. Total
Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct.
Cond. 1 15 41.67 14 38.89 7 19.44 0 0.00 36 100
Cond. 2 21 55.26 12 31.58 5 13.16 0 0.00 38 100
Cond. 3 34 44.74 16 21.05 26 34.21 0 0.00 76 100
Education: 1st Yr. 2nd Yr. 3rd Yr. 4th Yr.+ Total
Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct. Fr. Pct.
Cond. 1 11 30.56 13 36.11 6 16.67 6 16.67 36 100
Cond. 2 8 21.05 12 31.58 7 18.42 11 28.95 38 100
Cond. 3 4 5.26 15 19.74 30 39.47 27 35.53 76 100
Note: All measures are self reports. For each category of each variable, the first column gives the frequency, and the second
column gives the percentage.
Table B.3: Summary Distributions of Group Size Variable for Subjects in the Real-Time
Social Pressure Experiment
Min. 1st Qu. Med. 3rd Qu. Max. Mean S.D. N
Cond. 1 4 7 7 9 9 7.39 1.54 36
Cond. 2 5 6 7 7 9 6.87 1.19 38
Cond. 3 3 5 6 6 8 5.67 1.11 76
Note: Group size is the number of subjects who showed up on a given study date and waited together in the common waiting
room. See text in Chapter 3.
120
Appendix C
Experimental Results
To test hypotheses about individual propensities to give the egalitarian and inegalitarian
responses under various circumstances, many of the analyses in Chapter 3 combined response
options for questions with more than two choices. This Appendix illustrates graphically the
raw uncombined data from the Looming Social Pressure Experiment for questions with more
than two response options. These are presented in Figure C.1.
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Figure C.1: Raw Distribution of Responses for Questions from the Looming Social Pressure
Experiment with More than Two Choices
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Figure continued on next page.
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Figure C.1: Raw Distribution of Responses for Questions from the Looming Social Pressure
Experiment with More than Two Choices (continued from previous page)
Q9: How worried are you, if at all, about
radicals within the U.S. Muslim commu-
nity?
Q12: Do you think that most, many, only
some, or very few Muslims living in the
United States today are peaceable and do
not condone violence?
Control
Treatment
Pe
rc
e
n
t
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Very A Little Not At All
17
10
88
34
46
9
Control: N = 151
Treatment: N = 53
Control
Treatment
Pe
rc
e
n
t
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Most Many Only Some V. Few
100
28
42
24
6 1 2
Control: N = 150
Treatment: N = 53
Q17: Do you think that most, many, only
some, or very few Muslims living in the
United States today support the goals of
Al Qaeda and the fundamentalists?
Q18: Do you favor laws that prohibit dis-
crimination against Muslims?
Control
Treatment
Pe
rc
e
n
t
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Most Many Only Some V. Few
1 0 6 2
38 14
106 37
Control: N = 151
Treatment: N = 53
Control
Treatment
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rc
e
n
t
0
20
40
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80
10
0
Str. Fav. Favor Oppose Str. Opp.
24
12
48 19 47
11 31 11
Control: N = 150
Treatment: N = 53
Note: Bar heights are percentages within categories. Numbers above bars are the actual number of respondents in each category.
123
References
Adams, Henry F. 1912. “Autokinetic Sensations.” Psychological Monographs 14(59): 1–45.
Adrian, Charles R., and Charles Press. 1968. “Decision Costs in Coalition Formation.”
American Political Science Review 62(2): 556–563.
Ahn, T.K., Robert Huckfeldt, and John Barry Ryan. 2010. “Communication, Influence, and
Informational Asymmetries among Voters.” Political Psychology 31(5): 763–787.
Akerlof, George A. 1980. “A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be
One Consequence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 94(4): 749–775.
Aleman, Jose. 2009. “The Politics of Tripartite Cooperation in New Democracies: A Multi-
Level Analysis.” International Political Science Review 30(2): 141–162.
Asch, S. E. 1951. “Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of
Judgments.” In Groups, Leadership and Men, ed. Harold Guetzkow. New York: Russell
and Russell pp. 177–190.
Asch, Solomon E. 1952. Social Psychology. New York: Prentice Hall.
Asch, Solomon E. 1956. “Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of One
Against a Unanimous Majority.” Psychological Monographs 70(9).
Bandura, Albert. 1977. Social Learning Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Barabas, Jason. 2004. “How Deliberation Affects Policy Opinions.” American Political Sci-
ence Review 98(4): 687–702.
Bednar, Jenna, Aaron Bramson, Andrea Jones-Rooy, and Scott Page. 2010. “Emergent
Cultural Signatures and Persistent Diversity: A Model of Conformity and Consistency.”
Rationality and Society 22(4): 407–444.
Belleflamme, Paul, and Francis Bloch. 2004. “Market Sharing Agreements and Stable Col-
lusive Networks.” International Economic Review 45(2): 387–411.
Bernheim, B. Douglas. 1994. “A Theory of Conformity.” Journal of Political Economy
102(5): 841–877.
124
Bloch, Francis, and Bhaskar Dutta. 2009. “Communication Networks with Endogenous Link
Strength.” Games and Economic Behavior 66(1): 39–56.
Bloch, Francis, and Matthew O. Jackson. 2007. “The Formation of Networks with Transfers
among Players.” Journal of Economic Theory 133(1): 83–110.
Boyd, Robert, and Peter J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Boyd, Robert, and Peter J. Richerson. 2005. The Origin and Evolution of Cultures. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Breton, Albert, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe. 1995. Nationalism
and Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Broschek, Joerg. 2010. “Federalism and Political Change: Canada and Germany in
Historical-Institutionalist Perspective.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 43(1): 1–24.
Brown, David. 2000. Contemporary Nationalism. London: Routledge.
Burt, Ronald S. 1987. “Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion versus Structural Equiv-
alence.” American Journal of Sociology 92(6): 1287–1335.
Calvo´-Armengol, Antoni, and Rahmi Ilkilic¸. 2009. “Pairwise-Stability and Nash Equilibria
in Network Formation.” International Journal of Game Theory 38(1): 51–79.
Cao, Xun, and Aseem Prakash. 2010. “Trade Competition and Domestic Pollution: A Panel
Study, 1980–2003.” International Organization 64(3): 481–503.
Carnap, Rudolf. 1962. Meaning and Necessity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Caroyal, Nicolas, and Pascale Roux. 2009. “Knowledge Flows and the Geography of Net-
works: A Strategic Model of Small World Formation.” Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 71(2): 414–427.
Crowne, Douglas P., and David Marlowe. 1960. “A New Scale of Social Desirability Inde-
pendent of Psychopathology.” Journal of Consulting Psychology 24(4): 349–354.
Deutsch, Morton, and Harold B. Gerard. 1955. “A Study of Normative and Informational
Social Influences Upon Individual Judgment.” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology
51(3): 629–636.
Durkheim, E´mile. [1895] 1965. The Rules of Sociological Method. New York: Free Press.
Erdo¨s, Paul, and Alfre´d Re´nyi. 1959. “On Random Graphs.” Publicationes Mathematicae
Debrecen 6: 290–297.
Eulau, Heinz. 1986. Politics, Self, and Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
125
Fagiolo, Giorgio, Javier Reyes, and Stefano Schiavo. 2010. “The Evolution of the World
Trade Web: A Weighted Network Analysis.” Journal of Evolutionary Economics 20(4):
479–514.
Festinger, Leon. 1954. “A Theory of Social Comparison Processes.” Human Relations 7(2):
117–140.
Festinger, Leon. 1957. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.
Fisher, R. A. 1922. “On the Interpretation of χ2 from Contingency Tables, and the Calcu-
lation of P.” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 85(1): 87–94.
Fowler, James H. 2006. “Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks.”
Political Analysis 14(4): 456–487.
Fowler, James H., and Oleg Smirnov. 2007. Mandates, Parties, and Voters: How Elections
Shape the Future. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Franzese, Jr., Robert J., and Jude C. Hays. 2008. “Interdependence in Comparative Politics:
Substance, Theory, Empirics, Substance.” Comparative Political Studies 41(4–5): 742–780.
Gibson, James L. 2001. “Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating
Russia’s Democratic Transition.” American Journal of Political Science 45(1): 51–68.
Goyal, Sanjeev, and Sumit Joshi. 2003. “Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly.” Games
and Economic Behavior 43(1): 57–85.
Granovetter, Mark. 1985. “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embed-
dedness.” American Journal of Sociology 91(3): 481–510.
Granovetter, Mark. 1986. “The Micro-Structure of School Desegregation.” In School Deseg-
regation Research, ed. Jeffrey Prager, Douglas Longshore, and Melvin Seeman. New York:
Plenum Press pp. 81–110.
Grofman, Bernard N. 1982. “A Dynamic Model of Protocoalition Formation in Ideological
n-space.” Behavioral Science 27(1): 77–90.
Hardin, Curtis D., and E. Tory Higgins. 1996. “Shared Reality: How Social Verification
Makes the Subjective Objective.” In Handbook of Motivation and Cognition: The Inter-
personal Context, ed. Richard M. Sorrentino, and E. Tory Higgins. New York: Guilford
Press pp. 28–84.
Henrich, Joe, and Robert Boyd. 1998. “The Evolution of Conformist Transmission and the
Emergence of Between-Group Differences.” Evolution and Human Behavior 19(4): 215–
241.
Henrich, Joseph. 2001. “Cultural Transmission and the Diffusion of Innovations: Adop-
tion Dynamics Indicate That Biased Cultural Transmission Is the Predominate Force in
Behavioral Change.” American Anthropologist 103(4): 992–1013.
126
Henrich, Joseph, and Robert Boyd. 2001. “Why People Punish Defectors: Weak Conformist
Transmission can Stabilize Costly Enforcement of Norms in Cooperative Dilemmas.” Jour-
nal of Theoretical Biology 208(1): 79–89.
Hojman, Daniel A., and Adam Szeid. 2008. “Core and Periphery in Networks.” Journal of
Economic Theory 139(1): 295–309.
Huckfeldt, Robert, and John Sprague. 1987. “Networks in Context: The Social Flow of
Political Information.” American Political Science Review 81(4): 1197–1216.
Huckfeldt, Robert, and John Sprague. 1995. Citizens, Politics, and Social Communication:
Information and Influence in an Election Campaign. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Jackson, Matthew O. 2008. Social and Economic Networks. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Jackson, Matthew O., and Asher Wolinsky. 1996. “A Strategic Model of Social and Economic
Networks.” Journal of Economic Theory 71(1): 44–74.
Jacobs, Robert C., and Donald T. Campbell. 1961. “The Perpetuation of an Arbitrary Tra-
dition Through Several Generations of a Laboratory Microculture.” Journal of Abnormal
and Social Psychology 62(3): 649–658.
Jones, Bryan D., and Christian Breunig. 2007. “Noah and Joseph Effects in Government
Budgets: Analyzing Long-Term Memory.” Policy Studies Journal 35(3): 329–348.
Jones, Stephen R. G. 1984. The Economics of Conformism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Joshi, Sumit. 2008. “Endogenous Formation of Coalitions in a Model of a Race.” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization 65(1): 62–85.
Katz, Elihu. 1957. “The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-To Date Report on an
Hypothesis.” Public Opinion Quarterly 21(1): 61–78.
Katz, Elihu, and Paul F. Lazarsfeld. 1955. Personal Influence: The Part Played by People
in the Flow of Mass Communications. New York: Free Press.
Kellas, James G. 1998. The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. New York: St. Martin’s
Press.
Kelley, Harold H. 1952. “Two Functions of Reference Groups.” In Readings in Social Psy-
chology, ed. Guy E. Swanson, Theodore M. Newcombe, and Eugene L. Hartley. Revised
ed. New York: Henry Holt and Company pp. 410–414.
Kiesler, Charles A., and Sara B. Kiesler. 1969. Conformity. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Kuran, Timur. 1987. “Preference Falsification, Policy Continuity and Collective Conser-
vatism.” Economic Journal 97(387): 642–665.
127
Kuran, Timur. 1989. “Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revo-
lution.” Public Choice 61(1): 41–74.
Kuran, Timur. 1990. “Private and Public Preferences.” Economics and Philosophy 6(1):
1–26.
Kuran, Timur. 1991. “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European
Revolution of 1989.” World Politics 44(1): 7–48.
Kuran, Timur. 1995. Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference
Falsification. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1990. “Coalitions and Cabinet Government.”
American Political Science Review 84(3): 873–890.
Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet. 1948. The People’s Choice: How
the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Lee, Terence. 2009. “The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining
the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia.” Comparative Political
Studies 42(5): 640–669.
Levitan, Lindsey Clark, and Penny S. Visser. 2008. “The Impact of the Social Context
on Resistance to Persuasion: Effortful versus Effortless Responses to Counter-attitudinal
Information.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44(3): 640–649.
MacKuen, Michael. 1990. “Speaking of Politics: Individual Conversational Choice, Public
Opinion, and the Prospects for Deliberative Democracy.” In Information and Democratic
Processes, ed. John A. Ferejohn, and James H. Kuklinski. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois
Press pp. 59–99.
Mauleon, Ana, Huasheng Song, and Vincent Vannetelbosch. 2010. “Networks of Free Trade
Agreements among Heterogeneous Countries.” Journal of Public Economic Theory 12(3):
471–500.
McClurg, Scott D. 2006. “The Electoral Relevance of Political Talk: Examining Disagree-
ment and Expertise Effects in Social Networks on Political Participation.” American Jour-
nal of Political Science 50(3): 737–754.
Mead, George Herbert. 1934. Mind, Self and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social
Behaviorist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mendelberg, Tali. 2001. The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the
Norm of Equality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mutz, Diana. 2002. “Cross-Cutting Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice.”
American Political Science Review 96(1): 111–126.
128
Mutz, Diana C. 1998. Impersonal Influence: How Perceptions of Mass Collectives Affect
Political Attitudes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mutz, Diana C., and Jeffery J. Mondak. 2006. “The Workplace as a Context for Cross-
Cutting Political Discourse.” Journal of Politics 68(1): 140–155.
Myerson, Roger B. 1977. “Graphs and Cooperation in Games.” Mathematics of Operations
Research 2(3): 225–229.
Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. 1974. “The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion.”
Journal of Communication 24(2): 43–51.
Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. 1984. The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion—Our Social Skin.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Page, Scott E. 2007. “Type Interaction Models and the Rule of Six.” Economic Theory
30(2): 223–241.
Page, Scott E., Leonard M. Sander, and Casey M. Schneider-Mizell. 2007. “Conformity and
Dissonance in Generalized Voter Models.” Journal of Statistical Physics 128(6): 1279–
1287.
Rapaport, Anatol. 1957. “A Contribution to the Theory of Random and Biased Nets.”
Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 19(4): 257–271.
Reiter, Dan. 1994. “Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the
Past.” World Politics 46(4): 490–526.
Saggi, Kamal, and Halis Murat Yildiz. 2010. “Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Quest
for Global Free Trade.” Journal of International Economics 81(1): 26–37.
Schlag, Karl H. 1998. “Why Imitate, and If So, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to
Multi-Armed Bandits.” Journal of Economic Theory 78(1): 191–209.
Schuman, Howard, Charlotte Steeh, Lawrence Bobo, and Maria Krysan. 1998. Racial At-
titudes in America: Trends and Interpretations. Revised ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Sherif, Muzafer. 1935. “A Study of Some Social Factors in Perception.” Archives of Psy-
chology 27(187).
Sherif, Muzafer. 1936. The Psychology of Social Norms. New York: Harper and Brothers.
Shipan, Charles R., and Craig Volden. 2008. “The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion.” Amer-
ican Journal of Political Science 52(4): 840–857.
Siegel, David A. 2009. “Social Networks and Collective Action.” American Journal of Po-
litical Science 53(1): 122–138.
Smith, Anthony D. 1998. Nationalism and Modernism. London: Routledge.
129
Thelen, Mark H., Stephen J. Dollinger, and Karen D. Kirkland. 1979. “Imitation and
Response Uncertainty.” Journal of Genetic Psychology 135(1): 139–152.
Tingsen, Herbert. 1937. Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics. London: King.
Ullmann-Margalit, Edna. 1977. The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Verhulst, Brad, and Lindsey Clark Levitan. 2009. “Conformity in Groups: The Effects of
Groups on Expressed Attitudes.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Interna-
tional Society of Political Psychology, July 14, Dublin, Ireland.
Visser, Penny S., and Robert R. Mirabile. 2004. “Attitudes in the Social Context: The
Impact of Social Network Composition on Individual-Level Attitude Strength.” Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology 87(6): 779–795.
Walt, Stephen M. 1987. Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Weber, Klaus, Gerald F. Davis, and Michael Lounsbury. 2009. “Policy as Myth and Cer-
emony? The Global Spread of Stock Exchanges, 1980–2005.” Academy of Management
Journal 52(6): 1319–1347.
Yates, F. 1934. “Contingency Tables Involving Small Numbers and the χ2 Test.” Supplement
to the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 1(2): 217–235.
Young, H. Peyton. 1998. Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory
of Institutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
130
